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Abstract 
 
Whether Canada chooses to adhere to its responsibilities to meet its climate change targets or 
not, investors in Canada have a lot to be concerned about. The imminent threat of human induced 
climate change will have the global community reacting in ways that will affect Canada and their 
investors. This thesis explored the Canadian equity market through the lens of an investor who is 
interested in investing with particular strategies that address climate change with respect to 
carbon emissions. Both modern portfolio theory and behavioral finance theory were explored and 
demonstrated that both investor types should be concerned about the climate change related risks; 
that the two theories contending paradigms are bridged on the topic of socially responsible 
investing concerning carbon related risks in respect to climate change. The two techniques 
utilized for portfolio construction that addressed carbon related risk and supported moral and 
ethical ideologies were: tiered divestment of fossil fuel related companies and utilizing carbon 
footprinting metrics to create best in-class portfolios. Throughout the period of January 2011 to 
August 2015 the resulting portfolios of the two strategies outperformed relative to their associated 
benchmark; that is, offering a superior risk/return while mitigating the risk associated to carbon 
emissions. These results contribute the body of the literature that analyzes the link between 
socially responsible investing and financial performance.   
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1 
1 Background 
This paper will explore the Canadian equity market through the lens of an investor who is 
interested in investing with particular strategies that address climate change with respect to 
carbon emissions. The following paragraphs will provide background for this research topic and 
why it is of current importance to study. 
 
Human interaction with global ecosystems, ranging from agricultural to colonialism, has not 
escaped Earth’s natural variability for the past 10,000 years. Evidence such as abnormal increases 
in global average atmospheric temperature, sea level rise, and an increase in atmospheric nitrogen 
support the assertion that humans are no longer interacting with the planet at a sustainable rate 
(Steffan, 2011). This is commonly referred to as anthropogenic climate change. Although the 
definition of climate change is varying and debated, there is general consensus that the earth is 
changing and countries need some form of action, interacting on a global stage (IPCC, 2016). 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary 
international membership organization representing 196 parties (UNFCC, 2016). This 
organization has brought forth non-binding treaties such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 
agreements such as the 2015 Paris agreement amongst parties (countries). The Paris agreement 
established a two degree target for a maximum of average global temperature rise from pre 
industrial levels but urges efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees (UNFCCC, 2015; European 
Commission 2015; Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2016) and adds longer term targets 
for individual countries to lower their emissions levels. The main goal of the UNFCCC is to bring 
awareness to climate change with the intention of stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
concentrations, the main human contributor to climate change, to prevent irreversible damage to 
our ecosystems (UNFCCC, 2016). Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted 
from human activities; the latest IPCC report states CO2 accounted for approximately 60% of all 
GHGs in 2010 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014). While CO2 comes from a 
variety of natural sources, human-related CO2 emissions are responsible for the abnormal increase 
in temperature that has occurred since the industrial revolution (EPA, 2016). Understanding that 
all the inhabitants of Earth have to live within a GHG constrained society has brought forth many 
sub issues or problems that are attempting to be solved through many different angles and multi-
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faceted approaches, implications from which are important for investors to address and 
understand.   
 
Investors are seeking out ways to understand how companies’ GHG emissions and associated 
operations can affect their investment portfolios; not only how they can mitigate risk, but also 
how they can re-allocate their capital to support a lower GHG society (it is worthwhile to note 
here that most industry jargon does not use GHG but rather “carbon” and is calculated as the total 
amount of carbon equivalent; going forward carbon will assume to be as such).  
 
In September 2014, two investor climate pledges were announced. The Montreal Carbon 
Pledge, which focuses on mobilizing investors to measure and disclose the carbon footprint of 
their portfolios (Montreal Carbon Pledge, 2016) and the Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition 
(PDC), which focuses on decarbonizing portfolios (Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition, 2016). 
Both are supported through the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) 
and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI), accordingly. This 
demonstrates that the global governing body for climate change, the United Nations, supports the 
GHG disclosure from companies and for investors to re-allocate their capital based upon a 
company’s practices, specifically related to carbon emissions.  
 
Canada’s role within addressing climate change is a very delicate and tangled issue. The 
country’s energy sector in 2013 contributed to 10% of gross domestic product (GDP- nominal) 
and directly employed nearly 300,000 people (Stats Canada, 2013). The oil sector in 2014 alone 
represented 8.5% of Canada’s total GHG emissions, which includes the Alberta oil sands - the 3rd 
largest oil reserve in the world (Natural Resources Canada, 2016). Between 1999 and 2013, 
approximately $201 billion was invested in the oil sands industry, and in 2013, 133, 053 people 
were employed in Alberta’s upstream oil sector (Energy Alberta, 2016). The international 
commitments made by Canada through the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 were not met and the more 
recent commitment of 30% by 2030 from the Paris agreement will be unlikely achieved if Canada 
continues to expand its oil sector within the Alberta tar sands. Therefore, new regulations such as 
an economy-wide carbon tax, a cap on emissions from the oil sands and a phase-out of coal-fired 
power, are being considered by Alberta (Jones & Humes, 2016) alone. If Canada is to adhere to 
its climate change targets, fossil fuel production and consumption are significant areas for GHG 
reductions. 
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Canada’s commitment to GHG reduction is not the main concern of Jeff Rubin, a senior 
fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), for investors. “It is the 
sector’s huge production costs, not its emission profile, that poses the greatest threat. As one of 
the most expensive sources of oil in the world, no improvement in oil sands emissions is going to 
safeguard production level in a decarbonizing global economy that will be consuming less and 
less oil over time” (Rubin, 2016, 1). This brings forth the topic of an industry collapse regardless 
if the government is in support or not and the issues of stranded assets and high capital 
expenditure costs for investors. Therefore, regardless if Canada takes an active approach for GHG 
reduction or not, investors within Canada have many factors to consider when deciding if fossil 
fuel investments and carbon intensive companies are going provide adequate payoffs.  
 
The fear of negative consequences for holding onto fossil fuel assets came into fruition for 
pension plans in 2014. In the second half of 2014, when the commodity price for oil dropped, 
Canada’s five biggest pension funds lost approximately $2.5 billion because of fossil fuel 
exposure. Canada’s ten largest pension plans hold an equivalent of 45% of Canada’s GDP, 
accounting for $1.1 trillion (Canada Benefits, 2015). This sent a signal out to Canadians they 
need to be aware of climate change risks for their investments.  
 
The additional issue for investors is that regardless of Canada’s action or inaction, there is a 
building urgency for these institutions to take their own action to tackle climate change, that it 
should be part of their moral and ethical responsibilities. The Responsible Investment Association 
(RIA) Canada, the leading membership organization for responsible investment, has a purpose to 
promote the practice of responsible investing in Canada, showcasing the positive risk adjusted 
returns and societal impacts of these investments (RIA Canada, 2016). This addresses the 
concerns from Canadians about the behavior of companies they invest in, in particular, the impact 
that corporations have on their communities and constituencies.  
 
This topic of investing within the Canadian equity markets to address carbon related climate 
change risk and moral and ethical perspectives will be explored in detail in this thesis using a 
quantitative portfolio management approach. First, to gain a greater understanding of how 
investors interpret climate change with respect to carbon emissions through investment theory 
and industry approaches, and why this topic is critical to approach in a thorough study, a literature 
review has been completed. The predominant financial theories that are used in the market and 
studied heavily by economists will be discussed first, how the equity markets view climate 
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change, then what is socially responsible investing, supported empirical evidence and lastly, the 
approaches used for environmentally social responsible investors.  
 
 	  
 5 
2 Literature Review 
Public markets had been well established prior to the commencement of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) in 1773. Whether it was buying stock of one of the East India companies in 
coffee shops or even earlier, or dealing with the moneylenders in Venice back in 1300s, these 
were all forms of a public market (Bramble & Media, 2016).  Organized exchanges started to 
form when investors realized that they functioned more effectively, requiring the disclosure of at 
least some information as part of the price of access to the exchange. Throughout time the 
evolution of technology and further regulation has made the equity markets what they are today, 
namely a method for the diffusion of ownership of companies (Knight Capital Group, 2010), 
supplying personal wealth for private investment and supplying capital to support industry growth 
(Bramble & Media, 2016). The original goal of markets was not to make money from fluctuating 
share prices, but rather to provide financial resources for enterprises, thereby increasing economic 
growth (The Guardian, 2013). Although taking a systems approach to disentangle the issues of 
investor responsibility would be interesting, this paper focuses on a different approach, utilizing 
investor responsibility for adhering to Canada’s climate change targets.  
 
Through the lens of the investor, this paper will investigate if one can invest in a climate-
constrained society within the Canadian equity markets to reduce their exposure against carbon 
emissions and carbon related industries. How the equity markets operate and the methods for 
portfolio construction amongst investors vary, therefore, prior to discussing how an investor with 
an environmentally conscience mind can invest, the modern predominant theories for stock 
selection and portfolio construction will be discussed. Modern portfolio theory and behavioral 
theory are examined because they are the two prevailing ways investors view the stock market. 
Rational investors tend to lean towards modern portfolio theories to support their claims whereas 
humanistic investors use behavioral theories to support their rationale for resource allocation. 
What is of importance here is that, as will be shown, although socially responsible investing 
stems out of behavioral finance, these investors use conventional modern portfolio theory 
techniques to prove their strategies can at least adhere to the same risk/return profile. This is of 
great importance to not only convince traditional investors to incorporate the idea of climate 
change when investing but also to demonstrate the market is digesting climate change as a risk.  
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2.1 Modern Portfolio Theory  
2.1.1 Mean	  Variance	  Optimization	  and	  the	  Efficient	  Frontier	  
 
Harry Markowitz, often times referred to as the father of modern portfolio theory (MPT), 
clearly articulated an approach to portfolio construction, which has been cited as the origin of 
portfolio theory for many who have tracked the advancement of this field (Elton & Gruber, 1997; 
Fabozzi, Gupta, & Markowitz, 2002; C. Gregory, 2004). In Markowitz’s 1952 paper he describes 
how diversification does not solely depend upon the number of securities held but rather by 
having low co-variances amongst the stocks selected, commonly done by diversification across 
sectors. Additionally, how that efficiency, highest return (mean) for a given level of risk (as 
measured by a stock’s variance), might be the hypothesis for portfolio selection (Markowitz, 
1952). This means that rather than choosing stocks solely with the highest discount rate, portfolio 
selection is to be done by choosing the stocks that offer a given level of return for the lowest level 
of risk, as measured by the price movements of the stocks within a portfolio. The theory is an 
alternative of older methods that only looked at the individual merits of a stock. These concepts 
are later expanded in his 1959 book (Markowitz, 1959) and proved the fundamental theorem of 
mean variance optimization for portfolio theory; specifically, holding constant variance and 
maximizing expected return or holding constant expected return with minimal variance. These 
concepts led to the efficient frontier which allows investors to choose their portfolio based upon 
their risk return attributes (Elton & Gruber, 1997). The efficient frontier is commonly defined as 
the set of optimal portfolios (utility maxims) that offer the highest expected return for a defined 
level of risk or the lowest risk for a given level of expected return. This simplified approach, has 
been the predominant approach for portfolio construction amongst investors worldwide for at 
least the last few decades, when Markowitz was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990 
(Gregory, 2004). Figure 2-1 demonstrates how a piecewise linear curve is used as the efficient 
frontier and is the optimal line for risk and return. 
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Figure 2-1: The Efficient Frontier 
 
(Smart 401k, 2016) 
Where expected return on the portfolio is calculated as the sum of the expected returns of 
each asset multiplied by the weight within the portfolio and portfolio return variance and standard 
deviation (equation 2-1) is calculated as: 
 
Equation 2-1: Variance and Standard Deviation 𝜎!!   =    𝑊!!!!!! 𝜎!! + 2 𝑤!!!!!!!!!!!! 𝑤!!𝑟!!,!!𝜎!!𝜎!! and  𝜎! =    𝜎!! 
Where w is the weight of the n assets; 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the individual asset 1,..,n; 
r is the correlation between two assets in the portfolio (Markowitz, 1959). 
 
This theory is important to understand not only because it is a predominant part of investors’ 
strategies, but also because it can be used as a means of justification to investors when choosing 
alternative strategies that incorporate other criteria for the investments. For example, investors 
who divest from the fossil fuel sector and want to re-allocate the capital to the renewable sector 
can use statistics such as the returns of the portfolio and the measure of volatility to demonstrate 
that this approach is equivalent to the former, meaning the portfolios would have the same 
risk/return profile. If the latter approach was to have a better risk/return profile then it would 
show that excluding fossil fuel companies and including renewable companies is in fact more of 
an efficient portfolio, either decreasing risk while maintaining or raising the return or increasing 
return for a given level of risk. In this scenario it would also mean that these investors were not 
investing at their utility maxim (at the efficient frontier) in the first place.  
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2.1.2 Efficient	  Market	  Hypothesis	  (EMH)	  
 
The second theory, which grounds the modern portfolio theories of mean variance 
optimization and the efficient frontier, is that an efficient market price “fully reflects” all 
available information so the future returns is a function of the risk. This theory is entitled the 
efficient market theory or the theory of efficient markets, and claims that investors in the long 
term cannot beat the market. This theory has come out the empirical findings of market 
equilibrium (Jensen, 1968; Lintner, 1965; Malkiel & Fama, 1970). This is essential to know and 
understand because efficient market models are based upon market equilibrium (when supply and 
demand are equal) and that any information that is relevant to a stock price would be fully 
incorporated in the long run.  Therefore, if the market understood the pending climate change 
targets as a risk, investors would start seeing prices changes to stocks that would be affected by 
these targets. For example, if the market believed that the oil sands would not be able to extract 
all the proven reserves due to new regulation or decreased oil prices or lack of demand, then it 
would discount the future earnings and assets, lowering the stock price of these fossil fuel firms. 
Next, asset-pricing theories will be discussed, including how they relate to carbon emissions. 
2.1.3 Asset	  Pricing	  Theories	  
 
Asset pricing theories evolved out of the modern portfolio theory normative models that 
Markowitz and others such as Tobin (1958) and Hicks (1962) have contributed to.  As previously 
stated, these normative models deal with asset choice under conditions of risk, for example 
portfolio creation, but none attempt to extend them to construct a market equilibrium theory of 
asset prices under conditions of risk. What this extension of the theory provides is the relationship 
between the price of an asset and the various components of its overall risk. Sharpe (1962) and 
Linter (1965) proved that prices could be understood as a function of systematic (market/beta) 
and unsystematic risk. The infamous one factor capital asset pricing model was created out of 
these and demonstrated that approximately 70% of all risk could be attributed to systematic 
market risks, leaving the rest of the risk or the return to be attributed to stock specific 
characteristics (Fama & French, 1993). Over the past decades, researchers and asset managers for 
both individual assets and portfolios have used this model heavily. Later, Fama and French 
elaborated on the use of firm specific characteristics in explaining the return behavior of different 
types of portfolios. The size of a firm and the book to market value of a firm increases 
predictability of asset returns (Sharma & Mehta, 2013). Lastly, Carhart (1997) added a fourth 
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factor, 12 month momentum, and demonstrated that this factor not only further increases 
predictability but more so that the differences in a fund’s expenses and transaction costs explain 
almost all of the remaining return differences after applying the four factor model (the expanded 
definition of each factor and model creation will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
methodology section). Equation 2-2 is the Carhart model that incorporates the systematic and 
unsystematic risk (with three stock specific factors), which is used today by many investors for 
future price predictions. 
 
Equation 2-2: Cahart Model 
rit =   𝛼  + biTRMRFt + siT SMBt  + hiTHMLt = piTPR1YRt + eit 
                                                                                 t= 1,2,…,T 
 
Where rit is the return on a portfolio in excess of the one-month T-bill return; RMRF is the 
excess return on a market proxy (market return- one-month T-bill return); and SMB, HML, 
PR1YR are the returns on the value-weighted, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-
market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns (Carhart, 1997). 
 
These theories make it seem that the market can be understood algebraically in a way that 
explains investor behavior not by superior stock picking but rather by identifying the type of 
investor you are. It draws ease to investing because investors can seemingly remove the noise and 
simplistically invest by their risk/return profile. Asset pricing theories are a well-used method to 
calculate the value of a stock, but can also be used for empirical evidence that the market is 
valuing carbon emissions by understanding the value at risk from carbon exposure.  
2.2 Behavioral Finance 
 
‘Better late than never’ is how some might describe the adoption of Markowitz’s and pricing 
model theorist’s work. It has revolutionized how investors understand how the markets work and 
operate (Fabozzi et al., 2002). It is, however, one approach; the rational non-humanistic approach. 
As with most concepts and theories there are limitations and countering approaches. Issues such 
as the assumed risk free rate, measured commonly by government securities where the expected 
return equals the actual return (Damodaran, 2008), have led investors to use this quantitative 
approach alongside other strategies. This provides an advantage both by allowing the investor to 
verify that the portfolio is in itself diversified but also by diversifying their approach by adding in 
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some unique strategies of their own. This leads to the countering approach and the field of 
behavioral finance; an area of research that proves that although investors (humans) would like to 
always invest at a point of optimality, their utility maxim, it is inherently impossible because 
humans are not 100% rational, they are normal (Brunel, 2003; Statman, 2010).  
2.2.1 Prospect	  Theory	  	  
 
Considered to be the earliest researchers of behavioral finance and decision-making, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1977 and 1979 wrote papers speaking about the pitfalls of 
intuition and prediction, drawing on psychological literature to substantiate their claims. Their 
papers present a critique of expected utility theory (MPT) as a descriptive model of decision-
making under risk, and developed an alternative model called prospect theory. It states that 
people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are 
obtained with certainty, called the certainty effect or risk aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977, 
1979). Figure 2-2 shows the alternative function to expected utility under risk, where the 
reference point is asymmetrical.  Modern portfolio theory assumes the agents (investors) as 
rational, where the reference point does not matter. 
 
Figure 2-2:  The Value Function: Outcomes of Individuals making decisions under risk. 
 𝑉 =    𝜋 𝑝! 𝑣(𝑥!!!!! ). Where x1,…..,xn are potential  
outcomes, p1,…,pn are the probabilities, and v is the 
function that assigns the value to the outcome. The 
function that passes through the reference point is 
asymmetrical. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 
 
 Kahneman and Tversky’s theory supports the idea that people generally discard components 
that are shared by all prospects under consideration, commonly referred to as the isolation effect, 
and other violations of the expected utility paradigm (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001). Studies 
have proven that when faced with sequential gambles, people are more willing to take risk if they 
made money on prior gambles than if they lost (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). This demonstrates that 
rather than looking ahead at the future value of an investment, people take the past into account, 
where previous losses or the actual amount of money they currently have in hand are used to base 
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their decision upon. Kahneman and Tversky’s paper on prospect theory has been cited tens of 
thousands of times and was decisive in presenting Kahneman with the Nobel Prize in economic 
sciences in 2002 (Barberis, 2013).  Prospect theory can be used to demonstrate why investors 
who are risk averse would rather invest within a safer asset that offers lower return, rather than a 
higher return riskier asset. If an investor understands the pending threats climate change can have 
on the financial markets and has lost money from previous carbon bubbles, they might be more 
prone to spending their money on investments that mitigate against these risks (this will be 
discussed further in The Carbon Bubble section). 
2.2.2 The	  Equity	  Premium	  Puzzle	  
 
The economist Richard Thaler, one of the largest contributors to the evolution of behavioral 
finance, has published numerous papers within this field (Barberis, Huang, & Thaler, 2006; 
Kahneman & Thaler, 2006; Thaler, 1997, 2010; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Blending economics 
and psychology he continues to demonstrate that human irrationality is not considered in the 
traditional economic models.  His contributions aided in the most well-known application for 
prospect theory in finance, the aggregate stock market, which is the idea that loss aversion in 
particular can explain the equity puzzle; that the average return of the US stock market has 
historically exceeded the average return of treasury bills by a much greater margin than predicted 
by traditional consumption-based models of asset prices annually (Bernartzi & Thaler, 1995). 
Coined as the equity premium puzzle (Mehra & Prescott, 1985), due to investors being loss 
averse, the high dispersion of the distribution of returns is unappealing; the stock market, 
therefore, needs to have a high average return that is significantly higher than a safe asset like 
treasury bills. This also plays into arbitrage models where the pricing of the same company can 
be different in different markets and in different currencies. Thaler’s work strengthens the 
ideology that investors want to be paid more for what they consider as risk, as defined by 
traditional asset pricing models. The equity premium puzzle and loss aversion theories are 
important to understand because they show that investors who enter into the equity markets are 
seeking a higher pay-off relative to other asset classes. This empirically proven theory draws into 
the psychology of the investor. The equity markets, in Canada or not, are a private market 
mechanism that can be used to help mitigate the risks of climate change, and it is useful to 
understand the compensation expectation of these investors.  
2.2.3 Market	  Anomalies	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Two other main concepts within finance that prospect theory helps to explain are: the cross 
section of average returns and the trading of financial assets over time. Using the prospect theory 
utility from the change in the value of an investor’s portfolios over the course of a period, it leads 
to a new prediction of asset prices or the cross section of average returns that is not based on the 
traditional model of expected utility. Using cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), a security’s skewness in the distribution of its returns will be priced. The main result is 
that in contrast to the prediction of a standard expected utility model, a positively skewed security 
can be “overpriced” and can earn a negative average excess return (Barberis & Huang, 2008). For 
example, positive skewness is found if a stock has years of average returns, punctuated by 
selective high returns. Investors are entranced by the chance event of being very wealthy; they 
believe the stock could be the next Microsoft. As such, due to their poor probability weighting of 
future events, they overweight the stock, investors pile in, and the returns fall (The Economist, 
2013). Cumulative prospect theory has explained several financial phenomena: bankrupt stocks, 
out of the money stocks, and initial public offerings, among others. Additionally, there is research 
that supports people trade financial assets counterintuitive to what the empirical findings 
demonstrate. Relating specifically to the “disposition effect” where investors sell stock that have 
risen in price and hold stock that have fallen in value although empirically over the same horizon,  
stocks that have risen continue to rise due to the momentum effect and stocks that do poorly 
continue to lag (Barberis, 2013; Odean, 1998). Jagedeesh and Titman (1993) have also 
documented short-horizon momentum. Winners over the past 6 months subsequently 
outperformed 6-month past losers. Testing years later, the momentum strategy remained 
profitable, providing support to delayed overreaction behavioral models (Jegadeesh & Titman, 
2001).  
 
Behavioral finance does not alone demonstrate empirical evidence on how human cognitive 
biases inhibit the ability to function like an operating system (loss aversion, disposition effect) but 
that the market system does not react in clearly articulated algorithmic approaches (equity 
premium puzzle). This field goes against the modern portfolio theorist’s work by stating that a 
price of a security does not reflect all relevant information that is released (the markets are not 
fully efficient), and that financial models are not solely what humans cognitively use when 
making investment decisions. Due to the integration of various scientific knowledge, psychology 
and sociology, behavioral finance better explains market anomalies and financial behavior of 
individuals. This is important to understand because it highlights some of the flaws within the 
financial system and also provides support to investors who might not be interested in investing at 
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a point of conventional optimality. Behavioral finance demonstrates that the “irrational” investors 
and their financial behavior have an impact on prices, therefore, “irrational” investors are 
marginal and invest with non-random strategies. The spread of socially responsible business ideas 
has encouraged the need to invest in companies that apply such a business practice. “The 
investment instruments selection process involves a detailed and thorough analysis of financial 
indicators, enabling to conduct the investment activities and combine the investment in pursuit of 
profit and improvement of the public social environment” (Guzavicius, Vilkė, & Barkauskas, 
2014, 523).  This alludes to the understanding that a non-random investment approach that 
incorporates a well-articulated climate change aspect could cause an effect within the markets. 
The idea of socially responsible investing and how it is used within the context of the equity 
markets will be discussed in detail below. First, it is worthwhile to discuss the contentions 
between these two theories and how these contentions lean support to finding a suitable 
alternative for investment theory that can bridge these two contending fields.  
2.3 Contending arguments for MPT and Behavioral Finance 
The issues of modern portfolio theory (MPT) will be discussed first. Then the issues with 
behavioral finance will be discussed, noting the pitfalls between both fields. The issues between 
both schools of thought are not displayed to evaluate one set of theories against another, although 
it might seem so due to the criticisms of each field being mainly sourced from advocates of the 
alternative approaches.  This is how the field of study has developed. The reason for displaying 
the issues of both theories is that it is to demonstrate that neither paradigm nor approach to 
investment is perfect and that perhaps most investors might apply a blended approach when 
investing.  
2.3.1 Issues	  of	  MPT	  	  
 
As Thaler simplistically states, “modern financial theory is based on the assumption that the 
‘representative agent’ in the economy is rational in two ways: The representative agent (1) makes 
decisions according to the axioms of expected utility theory and (2) makes unbiased forecasts 
about the future. An extreme version of this theory assumes that every agent behaves in 
accordance with these assumptions” (Thaler, 2010, 13). He states that there are two arguments 
with this approach. First, knowing what individual investors are doing might still be of interest, 
regardless if asset prices are not set by these irrationalities. Secondly, although the argument is 
appealing and somewhat reassuring, its supporters have not been able to carefully execute it, 
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leading to large issues of it only being proper in theory because humans are not rational, they are 
normal.  
 
Given that MPT, EMH and the pricing models are based upon mathematical concepts, the 
second main critique lies within the assumptions that are made. Risk is defined as volatility; 
investors are risk adverse and are willing to take on more risk for a higher payoff, only measured 
by standard deviation or beta. Risk has not been defined as the financial strength, earnings, debt 
etc. that management uses when discussing the financial health of their company. Volatility is a 
measure that regards upside movement equally as bad as downside movement and when looking 
long term there is not a permanent correlation between risk and return (Travismorien, 2016). As 
empirical evidence has demonstrated, high volatility does not necessarily offer higher returns, nor 
does lower volatility offer lower returns (Haugen & Heins, 1975; Murphy, 1997).  
2.3.2 Issues	  of	  Behavioral	  Finance	  
 
The modern portfolio theorists contend the arguments made by the behavioral theorists by 
stating that irrational investors, the people that make suboptimal investment decisions, are not 
marginal; they do not make an effect to the asset prices. Economists that support conventional 
theories, such as Friedman and Fama, use their confined approaches to disprove certain concepts. 
Fama actually notes within his 1998 paper that many of the anomalies found in conventional 
theories could be considered shorter-term chance events that are eventually corrected over time 
(Fama, 1998).  Fama’s article specifically looks at the field of behavioral finance and uses many 
of the previously cited articles within this thesis to demonstrate that in fact evidence does not 
exist that market efficiency should be abandoned. Consistent with the market efficient hypothesis 
that the anomalies are chance results is about as frequent as post-event reversal, and that these 
apparent anomalies can be due to methodology, that slight change in technique allow these 
anomalies to disappear (Fama, 1998). This means that chance events over the long run are 
insignificant, and the differing methodologies are a causation to market anomalies.  
 
Another critique of behavioral finance, or more specifically with prospect theory, is although 
having excellent descriptions in experimental settings, the theory is not readily applicable in real 
world applications. A good critique that points out this problem of the prospect model is the lack 
of a clear definition of how one perceives an actual “gain” or “loss”. For example, if an investor’s 
focus is on the gains and losses in the value of their stock market holdings is it simply on the 
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return or the return less the risk-free rate or actually beating the market rate? Although some 
researchers are attempting to clarify these definitions further, other authors are stating that the 
question at hand is not whether one should replace traditional models with models in which 
people derive utility only from gains and losses, but rather whether it is useful to consider models 
in which people derive utility from both gains and losses and traditional models (Barberis, 2013). 
Again, this demonstrates that some behavioral finance theorists argue for the need to find a 
blended approach that incorporates more humanistic approaches to model investors returns.  
 
Lastly, given these criticisms it is clear that behavioral finance is descriptive in nature 
whereas modern portfolio theory is prescriptive in nature. Behavioral finance explains how agents 
in the market are inherently human but does not offer any solutions of how one can use the 
market to their advantage; drawing to their positive cognitive bias’ such as investing when they 
perceive a company is ‘good.’ Modern portfolio theory explains how the markets operate than 
prescribing action orientated approaches for investment; they have now seemingly become well 
applied within the investment world.  
 
It should be noted that there is wide support for both theories and the contention amongst 
researchers draws attention to the different paradigms that investors themselves can live within 
with regards to their investment approaches and the beliefs into how they understand how the 
markets should or do operate. This part of the literature review does not attempt to cover all the 
articles that have been published in regards to the theories and evidence but rather to outlay the 
findings of the predominant theories related to the two contending fields. These two fields, as 
demonstrated, have a large history of debating which is correct in understanding how the market 
works and operates. Both address the price (return and risk) and how an investor perceives it. An 
investor who is wanting to buy into companies that can support a carbon constrained future does 
not necessarily care only about the values of the companies and their attempt to counteract the 
prevailing issues of climate change; they are not a philanthropist and might also want to turn a 
profit. Therefore, the use of MPT’s applications such as the Carhart model would be useful to this 
investor to ensure that they are still investing at a point of optimality. Which means think of 
return and risk first, then attempt to invest with climate change on their mind secondary. 
Alternatively, if one forgoes the idea that market prices are determined not by the discounted 
future earnings of a company but rather how the agents interact with it, investors who are looking 
to invest in a climate constrained future might make less optimal investment decisions from a 
returns perspective, and reallocate their capital to the companies that they want to see be 
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supported for industry growth and help mold our society first. Regardless, of where an investor 
lies within the spectrum of how they think the markets should or do operate, climate change has 
brought forth a problem that all investors need to be aware of, this is entitled the carbon bubble, 
and will be discussed next.  
 
2.4 The Carbon Bubble  
 
To contextualize globally, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which is 
comprised of some of the world’s most acknowledged climate scientists, released a series of 
reports in 2013 and 2014 that for the first time quantified the global “carbon budget,” the amount 
of carbon dioxide emissions humans can emit while having the likelihood to remain below a 2 
degree Celsius increase in temperature above pre-industrial levels (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2014). As the IPCC and other climate scientists have demonstrated, the 
combustion of fossil fuel creates carbon emissions, which is directly linked to climate change. In 
addition, to remain within the global carbon budget, the amount of GHG that can be emitted 
before catastrophic changes happen to the earth ecosystems, equivalent 2/3 of proven reserves of 
fossil fuels, cannot be burned (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014; McGlade & 
Ekins, 2015). This means that proven reserves far exceed the amount that can be burned while 
staying within this budget, aside from technologies that prevent emissions such as carbon capture 
and storage (CCS). The global economy, faces the prospect of assets becoming stranded, in effect 
creating a carbon bubble (Carbon Tracker, 2013). 
 
Support for the existence of a carbon bubble within Canada can be viewed from two 
perspectives: Canada taking action on climate change and Canada not taking action on climate 
change. If Canada chooses to remain within its carbon budget, the maximum amount of CO2 that 
can be emitted in the future to maintain Canada’s portion of an increase in average global 
temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, it is implausible to operate business as usual within the 
fossil fuel industry. The country’s proven fossil fuel reserves are equivalent to 91 Gt, or 18% of 
the global carbon budget, whereas the plausible budget would be between 2 and 20 Gt. Therefore, 
regardless of an internationally negotiated budget based on export arrangements or any 
technological advancement, Canada will have to implement regulations or coerce the fossil fuel 
industry to lower their production levels in the oil sands (Lee & Ellis, 2013). From the other 
perspective, if Canada chooses not to act to maintain its carbon budget, the costs of the oil sands 
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production are too high to remain competitive in a global society that is decreasing its 
consumption of oil. This has the effect of making this industry no longer economically viable 
(Rubin, 2015). Both of these perspectives lead to what some researchers and industry analysts are 
terming stranded assets, which will be discussed below.  
 
A ‘bubble’ is “a market phenomenon characterized by surges in asset prices to levels 
significantly above the fundamental value of that asset. Bubbles are often hard to detect in real 
time because there is disagreement over the fundamental value of the asset” (Nasadq, 2016, 1). 
Therefore, regardless if Canada were to take action or not, supporters of the idea of living within 
a GHG constrained society or that the economic viability of certain assets are unlikely, believe 
that the stock prices of fossil fuel companies are overpriced. In Canada, the energy sector is the 
second largest by market capitalization, after the financial sector, representing 19.25% of the total 
S&P/TSX Composite. By the market currently failing to incorporate the new earnings trajectory 
of these firms or furthering discounting the earnings based upon the perceived risk for earnings 
potential these companies in aggregate have created an inflated sector price. This phenomenon of 
overpricing the aggregated fossil fuel companies is referred to as the ‘carbon bubble’.  
 
Market bubbles, as behavioral theorists point out, occur due to an over extrapolation where 
many investors’ beliefs about the future stock market are based on past performance. Many 
investors believe that stock prices will continue rising after they have previously risen, which is 
hard to reconcile with existing models of the aggregate stock market (Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, 
& Shleifer, 2015). Continual price rises create a mispricing where the stock’s price starts to 
exceed its fundamental value. One would think that in a completely rational world no one would 
buy such a stock, but behavioral theorists suggest that the considered rational investors would 
purchase based upon speculation of further price increase and the ability to sell at a greater price. 
For that to be the case, the new purchaser would have to either be irrational or another rational 
investor who thinks the price will still resell at yet higher prices, and so on. This demonstrates 
that informed and trained subjects produce substantial bubbles and crashes in the absence of 
common knowledge of rationality (Palan, 2013; Shiller, 2003).  
 
When compared to other market bubbles that have occurred in the past, such as the Dutch 
tulip mania, the stock market crash of 1929, Japan’s bubble economy of the 1980s, or the dot com 
bubble of the late 1900s (The Bubble Bubble, 2016) the carbon bubble is unique because it is the 
first bubble that not only is being debated as having firms being mispriced from a fundamental 
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perspective but from that of a moral and ethical perspective and based on pending policy changes. 
Some investors are screening out fossil fuel companies from a moral and ethical environmental 
perspective because they believe it is unjust to support companies that do not have the idea of 
living in carbon constrained society in mind. They are pricing the externalities of carbon or other 
natural resources. 
 
An investor’s decision not to purchase a fossil fuel company’s stock due to the moral and 
ethical practices that the firms engage in is rooted within the field of behavioral finance, and is 
commonly referred to as a type of socially responsible investing (SRI). Some research explains 
the evolution of SRI and its current discourse as being premised on the idea that markets are a 
positive and creative means for allocation of resources. It is founded on the view that the market 
mechanism is not a law of physics but instead a human-construct, which can be molded and 
tweaked to work in different ways (Bakshi, 2007). As stated previously, the human element is a 
large component of how behavioral theorists understand market pricing. In the following section, 
the definition of socially responsible investing, the past performance of SRI funds, and the type of 
SRI approaches, specifically with environmental SRI concerning the fossil fuel industry and 
carbon, will be discussed. First this paper will briefly discuss how the ‘carbon bubble’ is the first 
bubble that is considered to be within the field of SRI and how that plays a role within both 
behavioral and conventional finance. This will shed some light on why modern portfolio theory 
along with behavioral finance was critical to review and understand, drawing more towards the 
founded research gap.  
 
As a result of the 2008 global financial crisis, investors are starting to become much more 
aware of the driving patterns for bubble creation and are tending to be more risk averse. The 2008 
crisis was due to securities funded by mortgages of people that were said to be as credit worthy as 
government of Canada treasury bonds. The thought was that housing pricing would continue to 
rise. Similarly, the carbon bubble is proposed to be due to the implicit assumption that we can 
burn and emit as much carbon as we can, and that the price of oil will continue to rise (The Star, 
2015). Conventional investors are starting to understand the idea that only a fraction of this 
carbon can be burned, hence many proven reserves cannot be extracted, and as a result the global 
economy faces the prospect of assets that are currently recorded on companies’ books to be 
discounted. These assets are becoming known as stranded assets, which are environmentally 
unsustainable assets that suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs, downward 
reevaluations or are converted to liabilities (Ansar, Caldecott, & Tilbury, 2013). Whether these 
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assets become stranded due to governmental legislation such as a cap on extraction and 
production or legislation at the end use such as market schemes (carbon pricing or cap and trade), 
this can affect the price of these fossil fuel securities. Stranded assets are an inevitable effect of 
climate change policy (Fischer, 2015). Therefore, putting the moral and ethical debate aside, 
investors will want to find lower carbon securities to invest in that maintain their conventional 
risk/return profile. Conventional investors around the world are starting to be receptive to the 
information that a risk aversion market is a sustainable one that needs to incorporate non-financial 
criteria into their investment strategies. The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing 
states that “responsible investment should be pursued even by the investor whose sole purpose is 
financial return, because it argues that to ignore environmental, social or governance (ESG) 
factors is to ignore risks and opportunities that have a material effect on the returns delivered to 
clients and beneficiaries (PRI, 2016, 1). Consequently, whether an investor that engages with the 
markets is framed within the behavioral paradigms or not, the idea of the carbon bubble is real 
and needs to be addressed. Therefore, this analysis is applicable to both types of investors and as 
such both types of theories need to be incorporated in the methodology so that solutions of how 
one can invest with these problems in mind will utilize their financial language.  
2.5 Socially Responsible Investing  
 
Milton Friedman believes the sole social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, 
and that anyone preaching about eliminating discrimination or avoiding pollution or any other 
catchwords that encompass a firm’s “social conscience” is preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism (Friedman, 1970). Those catchwords would only be relevant if they affected the bottom 
line. Preach they will do because the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the firm’s 
responsibility to society, has been growing through both academic and industry communities for 
over 50 years. Dating back to the Religious Society of Friends in 1758, and more modernly to the 
civil rights issues of the 1960s, SRI has been used as a means to address injustices that should not 
be financially supported. Davis (1960) suggested that social responsibility refers to business’ 
“decisions and action taken for reasons at least partially beyond the firm’s direct economic or 
technical interest” (Davis, 1960,70).  This definition was used to understand the four types of 
social responsibility that constitute CSR in total. They are: economic, legal, ethical, and 
philanthropic. The field of socially responsible investing is driven by the economic field of CSR 
where the investors are considered a stakeholder and where their investments into a company 
demonstrate them morally supporting the actions of the firm. As an aside, it is worthwhile to note 
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although research cites SRI came out of CSR, it does not prove the linkage between CSR and SRI 
is a one-to-one connection. That is, if an investor is interested in a firm’s responsibility to the 
environment, they will invest with such ideals. Although the few studies that have explored this 
topic have demonstrated that understanding investors’ decision making process is important, 
further research needs to be completed (Glac, 2009, 2012).  
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) is commonly referred to as ethical investing, sustainable 
investing, triple-bottom-line investing, green investing, ESG (environmental, social, and 
governance) investing, value based investing, socially conscious investing, impact investing, 
among others. This paper will utilize the broadly used and supported term SRI. Although the 
approaches to SRI and its empirical support vary, socially responsible investing when loosely 
defined is normally in such agreement. Some definitions involve “integrating personal values and 
societal concerns with investment decisions” (Statman 2006; Schueth 2003; Shank et al. 2005) 
(from Berry & Junkus, 2008, 708). Others are “often defined as the integration of certain non-
financial concerns, such as ethical, social, or environmental, into the investment process” 
(Sandberg, Juravle, Hedesström, & Hamilton, 2009, 521). The Forum for Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment defines SRI as “an investment discipline that considers environmental, 
social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria to generate long-term competitive financial 
returns and positive societal impact” (USSIF, 2016, 1). Others state that these investment types 
are a matter of taste and do not see a need for a general definition, that sustainability means 
something different for every individual investor, and that sustainable investments sufficiently 
summarize every desirable non-financial impact an investment may have (von Wallis & Klein, 
2015). 
 
Regardless of the different words used, they all reflect the integration of non-financial criteria 
to support the wellness of the firm and non-economic stakeholders within the investment process. 
“SRI is of interest even to those who have a sharp critique of the prevailing form of market driven 
globalization but are keen to deploy varied means to contain its socially and environmentally 
destructive trends. SRI is merely one-dimension of the unfolding process of altering the operating 
system of Markets- so that externalities are more clearly accounting for and paid for, by both the 
producer and consumers. This could potentially encourage more realistic pricing of both natural 
resources and nature’s sinks, thus making way for sustainable prosperity” (Bakshi, 2007, 523).  
 
 21 
The terminology and definitions alone support the field of behavioral finance in that investors 
are not investing with cognitive biases but are actively selecting firms that go against their utility 
maxim. As a result of their personal choice on how they want to pursue investment opportunities, 
their utility maxim has moved from the conventional risk/return optimum to a subjective maxim. 
Sandberg et al. (2009) state that cultural differences might be one explanation for heterogeneity in 
the field of SRI and that it is quite unlikely that these differences might be resolved in the near 
future. It is important to discuss the empirical evidence of SRI to demonstrate the efficacy of 
investing responsibly because this will shed some light into the debate on whether one can invest 
against their utility maxim techniques without actually suffering from a loss in return/risk profile. 
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2012) find that near two-thirds of all published academic articles 
cover performance measurement, which the researchers explain by the fact that the research in 
this field is very data driven. Additionally, it is important to discuss the predominant 
methodological approaches that are used, specifically among environmentally conscience 
investors, because this will yield the approaches taken within this analysis. Therefore, SRI 
performance and SRI approaches are discussed. 
 
 
2.5.1 SRI	  Performance	  
 
As noted previously, based upon efficient market hypothesis all relevant information is 
reflected within the equity prices. This means that anything the market considers as risk will be 
reflected in the stocks discount rate and any predicted future event would be reflected within the 
future earnings of the company’s cash flows. In a perfect world for SRI investors, the market does 
see environmentally dangerous practices, such as the extraction of fossil fuels, as something that 
will come to an end. Therefore, it would lessen if not delete the future earnings of the fossil fuel 
extraction companies to zero, significantly driving down their stock price. The market would 
fully discount all non-climate conscience practices (such as pollution and waste) and price all 
natural capital. This is clearly not the case since, as mentioned above, the carbon bubble has not 
burst. Are SRI funds, however, outperforming and can investors make money by buying green or 
socially conscience? If the answer were yes, this would lean support to behavioral theory that 
there is a link between CSR practices and economic performance. 
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Most SRI funds aim to offer products that reflect investors’ values and provide investment 
returns to satisfy their financial goals. Bauer et. al (2008) noted that financial performance is a 
critical factor that determines the entrance of ethical funds into mainstream finance. As 
mentioned previously, some believe that the SRI portfolios under-perform conventional portfolios 
as the investment opportunity is constrained by the non-financial criterion and mean-variance 
efficient portfolios are not achievable (Tippet, 2001; Kahn et al. 1997; Geczy et al. 2005; Gregory 
et al. 1997). The empirical evidence to demonstrate whether SRI portfolios can ‘do well and 
good’, be socially responsible and offer competitive returns, is well supported starting in the 
1970’s and more heavily researched from the mid-2000’s and beyond. A review of the empirical 
literature on SRI performance was done in two-fold: what is the empirical evidence 
demonstrating and specifically, what is the evidence demonstrating within the Canadian markets?  
 
Empirical Evidence: General 
Given that risk is important when evaluating returns, studies have demonstrated that SRI 
mutual funds do not do worse than conventional mutual funds on a risk-return basis (Goldreyer & 
Diltz, 1999; Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008; Statman, 2000). A unique study understood 
risk differently and found evidence that suggests that preferences of social SR investors can be 
represented by a conditional multi attribute utility function in the sense that they appear to derive 
utility from being exposed to the SR attribute, especially when it delivers positive return (Bollen, 
2007). The list goes on for the studies with slightly varying approaches in regards to SRI type and 
timeline. Therefore it is useful to review meta studies that have been completed to understand the 
overarching conclusions. The following are two meta studies, completed in 2015, providing a 
more well rounded idea of the linkage between SRI and financial performance. The first study 
reviewed 60 review studies, combining more than 3700 study results from more than 2200 unique 
primary studies, and found that more than 90% of studies demonstrate a non-negative relation 
between SRI and financial performance. The main conclusion is that the orientation toward long-
term investing should be important for all kinds of rational investors in order to fulfill their 
fiduciary duty and may better align investors’ interests with the broader objectives of society 
(Friede, Busch, & Bassen, 2015). The second study, lists 53 studies of mainly the past 15 years 
that outlay the articles in categories of their results: equal performance, over performance or 
underperformance. The study then added a chart in each category to list the timeline, performance 
measurement and selection of social component. Although most studies analyzed did not 
demonstrate underperformance, the study concluded given the diversity of study type, a common 
understanding should be reached on what is considered an SRI fund (von Wallis & Klein, 2015). 
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Therefore, developing a measurement to quantify how socially responsible a specific investment 
vehicle really is. Although these two meta studies are surely not an exhaustive summary of all 
empirical studies relating to SRI and financial performance, it does demonstrate that an investor 
can ‘do well and good,’ at least under certain conditions. 
 
Empirical Evidence: Country Specific 
Most studies focused on SRI fund performance in individual countries such as the US (Cox & 
Schenider, 2006; Goldreyer & Diltz, 1999; Statman, 2000) and the UK (Cox & Schneider, 2006; 
A. Gregory & Whittaker, 2007; Hellsten & Mallin, 2006). Every study had differing timelines but 
demonstrated that SRI funds are not significantly different from that of non-SRI funds. There 
have also been studies that compare US and European performance (Cortez, Silva, & Areal, 
2012; Mollet & Ziegler, 2014). Only one study has been conducted in Canada, demonstrating 
insignificance amongst their conventional peers (Bauer, Derwall, & Otten, 2007). Lastly a cross-
country study, evaluating 103 mutual funds across UK, US, and Germany demonstrated that 
when controlling for the factors within the Carhart models, there is no statistical difference in 
returns (Bauer, Koedijk, & Otten, 2005). This demonstrates that Canadian based research for the 
link between ESG and financial performance is understudied and that using the Carhart model is 
useful to explain return attribution. 
 
As Berry & Junkus (2008) note, there is no underlying financial framework to relate the 
marginal social responsibility of an investment to an investment’s performance. In other words, 
there exists nothing that defines the optimal trade-off between social responsibility and other 
investment criteria, primarily risk and return. This summarizes well the lack of understanding on 
the years of conducted studies to analyze the difference types of SRI investments and whether 
that matters for fund performance. The majority of studies labeled them as ‘ethical funds’ or 
‘social funds’. Although it is important to show evidence that, generally, past strategies within the 
SRI field have performed well, it shows little evidence in the field of SRI that is specific to 
environmental criteria and outperformance. Additionally, given that the breadth of this research 
was completed over 5 years ago, the industry could have since reacted to climate change whereas 
the academic research has not been at the forefront. The following section will briefly outline the 
common different SRI strategies then narrow down on the current approaches used for an 
environmentally conscience investor, which are primarily industry driven.  
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2.5.2 SRI	  Approaches	  
 
SRI approaches can come in many forms. Berry & Junkus (2012) did a survey of 5,000 
investors, with both investors who have used SRI criteria in investment decisions and those who 
have not. Their study found that the surveyed investors considered environmental issues to be the 
most important, and that most investors prefer to award firms who display overall positive social 
practices. It also found that most SR vendors focus on an exclusionary approach, which is a 
disconnect that could be a factor in limiting the growth of SRI. This study and the evolving 
definition of SRI demonstrate that it is difficult for investors, vendors, and those who research the 
field to definitively categorize how SRI is applied. Sandberg et al. (2008) states the heterogeneity 
of SRI in regards to the terminological, practical, and strategic differences can stem from cultural 
and ideological differences. Furthermore, that the SRI stakeholders, the actors involved, can 
change the process which actually creates incentives for fund companies to develop terms, 
strategies and criteria slightly differently than their competitors. Given that the focus of this 
research is to understand the approaches used by industry for SRI in the minds of environmental 
investors, the use of approaches by investors and vendors will be discussed. First, the overarching 
approaches to SRI will be discussed to get an understanding of where the environmental 
approaches stem from. 
 
Corporate socially responsibility (CSR) standards attempt to create quantitative metrics to 
define the appropriate business behavior and responsibilities of business firms.  Behind this lies 
the assumption that positive corporate behavior provides positive economic consequences (Berry 
& Junkus, 2013). This is the idea that firms will do well by doing good (Statman, 2000) and is 
used to justify applying SRI criteria for investment decisions. As discussed previously, this is one 
reason why the link between SRI portfolios and economic performance was so heavily researched 
and is needed for the buy-in of traditional investors. CSR standards and principles have been 
circulated by many international organizations and NGOs in the past. The Sullivan Principles 
were used for the anti-Apartheid movement (Gosiger, 1986), the Caux Principles for moral 
capitalism (Caux Roundtable, 2016), and the Global Reporting Initiative for sustainability (GRI, 
2016) and all have been circulated and then used by investment professionals.  The UN Global 
Compact is an initiative for companies to align their strategies and operations with global 
principles on human rights, labour, environmental and anti-corruption. It urges companies to be 
more transparent and accountable, noting that capital markets now evaluate companies’ 
performance on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues (UN Global Compact, 
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2016). ESG is the catch-all term for the criteria being used within SRI (David Suzuki Foundation, 
2016). The Global Compact notes that investors know how to use ESG within their investment 
decisions due to UN-supported initiatives such as Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), 
UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), Equator Principles, Principles for Sustainable Insurance and 
the UN Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative.  
 
The ESG standards are one method of how to aid in the exclusionary or inclusionary, also 
known as positive and negative screening, approaches to investment; exclusionary means 
screening out firms that do not pass certain criterion and inclusionary means investing within 
firms that might encompass positive ESG criteria. Although they sound the same, their 
applicability is different. Investors who tend to use the exclusionary approach to investing create 
their portfolio based upon their conventional risk/return profile, then screen out the ones who do 
not meet ESG criterion. Investors who tend to use inclusionary approaches tend to use seek out 
firms who pass certain criterions then invest in a mix that can fulfill their risk/return profile (SRI 
Services, 2016; CFA Institute, 2014). RIA Canada notes that ‘screening in’ or ‘screening out’ 
should not be used for ESG, that integration must be verifiable by a transparent and systematic 
process by ESG research and analysis (RIA Canada, 2016). Additionally, other investor’s employ 
a strategy entitled best in class, where they rank companies against their industry peers and invest 
in the top by whichever criteria they use. This can be seen as a means for a positive selection 
technique. This demonstrates the understanding of ESG and the criterion used varies among 
investment professionals and the vendors vary, including their data.  
 
Other general approaches under the SRI umbrella are engagement/shareholder action, norms-
based screening, thematic investing, and impact investing (Global Sustainable Investment 
Alliance, 2014; RIA Canada, 2016). Given that these terms mean something different to each 
company, the first two will be defined by the Responsible Investment Association (RIA) Canada, 
the membership organization for RI in Canada, and impact investing will be defined by the 
Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN). Engagement/shareholder action is engaging in dialogue 
with companies’ management, voting proxies, and filing or co-filing shareholder resolutions. This 
is being an active shareholder. Thematic investing is investing in adaptive solutions that address 
challenging issues such as energy efficiency or green infrastructure (RIA Canada, 2016). Lastly, 
impact investing are “investments made into companies, organizations or funds with the intention 
to generate a measurable, beneficial social and environmental impact alongside a financial return” 
(GIIN, 2016). The engagement approach was not selected within this research due to the inability 
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to track their impact and how these approaches could effectively have an investor allocating their 
resources to equip Canada to a carbon constrained society. The thematic approaches are used in 
this analysis in conjunction for exclusionary approaches as re-investment opportunities to further 
strengthen an investor’s position in regards to their environmental beliefs. Lastly, the impact 
investing approach is arguably an evolving new field that although is complimentary to 
supplementing the capital markets to a carbon constrained society it is far out of scope of this 
research.  Therefore, the remaining part of the literature review will define the predominant 
inclusionary/exclusionary approaches for portfolio managers for the environmental aspect for 
ESG investing.  
2.6 Environmental SRI Approaches 
 
There is an array of environmental issues that can be looked at when evaluating a company 
and choosing whether to invest or not. MSCI, a leading data provider on ESG factors for 
investors to integrate within their portfolio construction and management process, identifies four 
themes under the environmental pillar. They are: climate change, natural resources, pollution & 
waste, and environmental opportunities. As aforementioned, this research is looking at the issues 
of adhering to Canada’s climate change targets, therefore, the theme of climate change will be 
addressed. The five key issues that MSCI outlays for climate change are: carbon emissions, 
energy efficiency, product carbon footprint, financing environmental impact, and climate change 
vulnerability (MSCI ESG Research Inc., 2014). Understanding that carbon emissions (equivalent 
GHG) is the main factor that attributes to climate change, this issue will be discussed in the 
context of climate change. The two main approaches of how an investor can invest with a concern 
of carbon within the industry are the fossil fuel free divestment movement and carbon 
footprinting. 
  
The fossil fuel free divestment movement and carbon footprinting both cater and appeal 
towards both definitive SRI investors and conventional investors. The divestment movement 
supports the idea of stranded assets, appealing to a risk aversion technique for conventional 
managers. Additionally, it appeals to SRI investors due their moral and ethical ideologies. The 
carbon footprinting approach will appeal more to the conventional investors who are embracing 
an SRI approach because of fear of end use policy and regulations, such as a limit on fossil fuels a 
firm can burn or a price on carbon. Furthermore, it appeals to SRI investors because they are 
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reallocating their capital to support a lower carbon society.  Next, the two approaches will be 
discussed in detail.  
2.6.1 Fossil	  Fuel	  Divestment	  	  
 
This alternative approach is under what is known as the fossil fuel divestment movement and 
has been heavily published and discussed since the launch of the campaign in 2012 (The 
Guardian, 2015). This campaign spread around the world and is seen as a means to challenge 
institutions worldwide to put their money with their mouth is. Simply put, divestment is the 
process in which an investor sells their shares, bonds, or investment funds due to moral or ethical 
reasons (Kaempher et. al, 2001).  It is the opposite of investment, where the assets are now 
considered against their own moral and ethical beliefs and their fiduciary duties and now need to 
be sold to adhere to their investment philosophies. “It is a socially motivated activity of private 
wealth owners, either individuals or groups such as university endowments, public pension funds, 
or their appointed asset managers” (Ansar et. al, 2015, 9). Used primarily as an exclusionary 
technique, divestment is under the umbrella of SRI because it integrates non-financial criterion 
within its investment process. Divestment has been used within the past for perceived injustices 
such as the atrocities in Sudan’s western region of Darfur, tobacco, munitions, and most famously 
for the racial and human rights violations of the South African Apartheid government (Kaempfer, 
Lehman, & Lowenberg, 1987). 
 
Although while excluding investments are the main method used by divestment campaigns 
historically, it can be combined with other methods, such as positive selections. The divest-invest 
movement for example, combines exclusionary approaches with investment strategies in 
renewable energy industries or other climate solutions (DivestInvest, 2015). The movement’s 
intention is to shift capital flows away from problem industries and accelerate the transition to a 
global economy fueled by renewable energy. Financially, advocates of the divestment campaign 
state that market data and trends demonstrate that people and institutions are getting out of fossil 
fuels before the carbon bubble bursts and assets are stranded.  
 
Divestment can be considered effective or successful in a few ways depending on what goals 
are embraced. 350.org’s (2016), the leaders of the movement, goal is to have the fossil free 
campaigns as one part of their overall movement to hold our leaders accountable to the realities of 
science and the principles of justice and to put an end to fossil fuel extraction. They see a 
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divestment success to be when other institutions, such as a university or church, release a 
divestment plan. The point is to remove the companies’ social license to operate.  The Stranded 
Assets Programme (SAP) at the University of Oxford states the three aims of the fossil fuel 
divestment campaign are:  i) force the fossil fuel companies and pressure the government, eg. via 
legislation, to leave fossil fuel in the ground, ii) pressure fossil fuel companies to undergo 
transformative change that can reduce emissions, and iii) pressure governments to enact 
legislation such as a ban on further drilling or carbon tax (Ansar et al., 2013). Hunt et al. (2016) 
does a comparative analysis on the anti-Apartheid and fossil fuel free campaigns to understand 
the similarities and differences between the campaigns. They state that discrepancies arise from 
an evolving understanding of what constitutes a socially responsible investment and that these 
campaigns strategies differ. Therefore, it is important to recognize that pursuing the fossil fuel 
divestment in the same manner as the anti-Apartheid movement would not be reasonable given 
the intended overall strategy and outcome, perceived best practices, or successes of the anti-
Apartheid campaign should not be readily replicated. 
 
Ritchie and Dowlatabadi (2014) attempted to reduce the carbon emissions associated with a 
Canadian university endowment through divestment but noted various challenges because of the 
structures of currently available financial instruments. Additionally, due to using a life cycle 
assessment approach, it was difficult to make significant reductions in the carbon shadow of a 
large pooled funding using conventional approaches to risk and return distribution across sectors. 
This study demonstrates the effects of divestment are debated amongst professionals and that 
even the use of divestment might not possible for endowments within a Canadian context. Others 
studies are attempting to discover whether divestment affects share prices (Ansar et al., 2013; 
Teoh, Welch, & Wazzan, 1999) or rather what the effects of divestments are (Hunt et al., 2016). 
As aforementioned, this research is from the lens of the investor. Therefore, what is important is 
not whether divestment effects share prices, companies or the economy but rather if it is possible 
for an investor to divest and perhaps, reinvest into lower carbon solutions without suffering from 
financial loss. In the following paragraph, the varying approaches to divestment will be discussed, 
understanding that the strategies for the reallocation of capital can also vary, and that re-
allocation to lower carbon solutions is one strategy.   
 
As the fossil fuel divestment campaign continues to evolve institutions are selecting methods 
for divestment such as only divesting from coal (The Guardian, 2015), divesting in only the top 
200 companies by fossil fuel reserves, divesting from specific types of fossil fuel players 
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(BrightNow, 2015) or full divestment from the fossil fuel industry (University of Glasgow, 2014). 
These approaches allow the institutions to take a stance on the perceived injustices from the fossil 
fuel industry without hurting their risk/return profile and changing their existing investment 
mandate. Fossil Free, the campaign supported by 350.org has a full list of the varying approaches 
to divestment and the institutions engaging within it (Fossil Free, 2016). 
2.6.2 Carbon	  Footprinting	  
 
Carbon footprinting is a new buzzword that has gained popularity over the last few decades. 
Rooted in Ecological Footprinting, Wackernagel (1996) describes it to stand for a certain amount 
of gaseous emissions that are relevant to climate change and associated with human production or 
consumption activities.  Carbon footprinting can be used in detailed, more accurate approaches 
such as life cycle analysis (LCA) to input-output models to simplistic approaches such as an 
online tool that estimates the carbon footprint of a flight from, for example, Copenhagen to San 
Francisco (Weidema et al., 2008).  The broad appeal of allowing estimation models versus LCA 
to flood the market is that it simplistically enables the masses to understand what generates higher 
levels of CO2 equivalent, which is the key focus for everyone to understand how to mitigate 
emissions output.  
 
This trend has hit the socially responsible and risk adverse investment world, notably in 2005 
when Europe introduced their emissions trading scheme, for disclosing a company’s annual 
carbon emissions output and using exclusionary/inclusionary approaches. As described by some 
of the leading climate strategists for investing “carbon footprinting data is, at its core, a measure 
of the GHG emissions of an underlying company allocated to its investor. Thus, it represents an 
absolute value (annual GHG emissions) that needs to be normalized to be comparable across 
companies, sectors, or portfolios” (2 degrees Investing Initiative, WRI, and UNEP-FI, 2015). 
Carbon footprinting is the most commonly used metric for climate friendliness and an integral 
part of the Montreal Carbon Pledge. As discussed previously, the idea of looming carbon pricing 
and regulations appeals to conventional investors and they are using carbon footprinting as a way 
to mitigate against this downside risk. SRI investors are implementing this approach not only for 
risk aversion but because it provides capital in favor of lower-carbon and climate-friendlier 
companies, projects, or assets. How investors use carbon footprinting in their investment process 
will be explored in the following paragraphs.  
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 Although there is guidance issued from certain sources, such as the Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol, there are no mandatory guidelines for companies on how to account their GHG 
emission inventory within Canada. Challenges arise from which emissions sources a company 
should include in their inventory and how to calculate them, what constitutes a full list of indirect 
supply chain activities, and how to determine which activities from such a list are significant by 
application.  Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is the leader in compiling voluntary data from 
companies, and urges all companies to use the Greenhouse Gas Protocol as a guideline. Many 
vendors such as Trucost, South Pole Carbon, and Carbon Screener use CDP as a starting point 
then build in their own propriety methodology to fill in the gaps (2 Degrees Investing Initiative, 
2013). This contributes to the next challenge for standardization within the marketplace: how 
vendors use and sell company data.  
 
 2 Degrees Investing Initiative, a multi-stakeholder think tank, did an analysis that reviewed 
the different types of portfolio footprint data sets and methodologies from the available vendors 
in the marketplace. Among others, the features compared were:  scope of emissions (scope 
1,2&3), rule of allocation to investors (share of ownership, share of financing, share of 
investment), asset types (equities, corporate bonds, real estate, sovereign bonds), GHG data used 
to calculate investees’ footprint (CDP, EEIO model, LCA analysis, GHG emission factors based 
on national inventories), sources of activity data and methods used for matching emissions factors 
of the model (sales, assets, outputs, industry specific approximations). The data providers 
typically aggregate and sell the data that flood the market place (2 Degrees Investing Initiative, 
2013).  Studies have researched which approach is most accurate in encompassing the appropriate 
GHG emissions for a company (Huang, Lenzen, Weber, Murray, & Matthews, 2009; Carnegie 
Mellon University, 2016). Although it is imperative to understand the most accurate way to 
calculate and estimate emissions for the issues of taking into account the total direct and indirect 
emissions (Carneige Mellon’s study demonstrates that on average scope 1+2 emissions are on 
average only 26% of the total supply chain), it is not the objective within this analysis. The 
objective here is to understand how carbon emissions are used for portfolio construction. 
 
Depending on which philosophy is embraced for investing you can use carbon data 
differently for portfolio construction. Using relevant metrics to assess a portfolio’s baseline 
exposure to climate related risks and opportunities is an important first step and will allow for 
normalization across sectors and other portfolios if need be. Advocates of the divestment 
approach associates the carbon emissions with the proven reserves in the ground, the proven 
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potential of CO2 emissions. This approach leans more towards the stranded assets/balance sheet 
approach, using assets to measure emissions potential. Using total carbon emissions considers the 
end use of these fossil fuel resources, being risk averse to pending policies and regulations 
associated with the use of fossil fuels. There are two approaches that commonly use total carbon 
emissions (equivalent GHG). The balance sheet approach is emissions related to share of 
ownership. This calculates the carbon footprint of the investor’s money or financed emissions. 
MSCI noted from a 2015 survey that carbon emissions per amount invested is regarded as the 
most important approach by investors (Frankel, Shakdwipee, & Nishikawa, 2015). The other 
dominant approach is the income statement approach, a way to calculate the total emissions 
burned (end-use) against revenue or sales. This takes into account the carbon efficiency of the 
company. In particular, it corrects for the biases introduced by market cap and price-to-sales ratio 
(Raynaud, 2015). Investors who are concerned about market or regulatory risks commonly use 
this approach. These two approaches use the exclusionary/inclusionary approach, applying an 
ESG criterion of a carbon emissions indicator as a screen. The formulas and details on how the 
carbon emissions indicators are applied will be expanded in the methods section.  
 
Lastly, it is important to understand which approach one is taking so that emissions data are 
not double count data emissions within the analysis. Double counting can occur within an 
investment portfolio primarily when using scope 2 and scope 3 in the analysis and different asset 
classes. According to Cross-asset footprint calculations, double-counting can reach 30-40% of an 
investor’s portfolio emissions (Raynaud, 2015). Ensuring that the data sources do not double 
count is important for portfolio construction because it can alter the investment decisions. Double 
counting can also occur given the nature of investment and divestment drawing in the problem of 
allocation amongst firms. Carbon is produced by the fossil fuel firms and used by all other 
industry including the firms themselves. Additionally, these footprinting approaches assume some 
responsibility to the investor, whether it is the equity or fixed income investor or bank. It is 
imperative to clearly define the approach that is taken and how much responsibility is allocated to 
whom so there is no overlap amongst supply chains, asset classes and investment types, the firm 
morally responsible etc., especially when an large investor implements these metrics alongside 
divestment strategies. 
 
To understand more of the risks and opportunities, an approach used alongside carbon 
footprinting, ‘green/brown’ metrics, is used to get an understanding of the dispersion of the 
climate challenge and opportunities within a portfolio. It allows a portfolio manager to 
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differentiate the firms within a sector that might have other quantifiable characteristics that could 
differentiate actors who are supporting a lower carbon society or not. For example, two car 
manufacturers can produce the same output for scope 1+2 emissions but one company could be 
making electric vehicles while the other is making combustion engine trucks. Measuring the 
average fuel economy of their fleet can solve this problem. Alternative industry and sector 
classification such the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board’s (SASB) is another tool, 
which considers green/brown data. The downfall of these metrics is that they are limited to a 
number of industries, there is no agreed classification system, and the data is not easily accessible 
in financial databases (2 Degrees Investing Initiative, 2013). These techniques are still within 
their infancy and need to have more clarity and be more accessible for the portfolio management 
process. 
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3 Objectives, Research Question, and Hypothesis 
 
This literature review has outlaid the problems that need to be addressed for investors, 
whether they want to embrace the moral and ethical ideologies for climate change, or not. This 
problem was supported by first describing the theories (MPT and behavioral theory) that support 
the two predominant paradigms, investing for profit or investing for resource allocation, that 
investors are operating within when understanding why the equity markets exist and how they 
operate (others theories were not chosen because they are considered to be less researched and 
applied). These theories demonstrate many contentions and brought forth an understanding that 
investors might live within a blended spectrum of these two paradigms, demonstrating the need 
for further research within this area. The topic of a carbon bubble in Canada is an example that 
has allured investors of both types to embrace unconventional strategies to mitigate their risks of 
the carbon bubble bursting and/or supporting a lower carbon society. A dynamic and changing 
blended approach, called socially responsible investing, is the umbrella term used to describe how 
investors can deploy investment strategies that utilize non-financial investment criterion. This 
literature review continued to explore the idea of socially responsible investing in respect to the 
environment, specifically climate change, and detailed the predominant strategies investors are 
using within the industry today. This brought forth two main research gaps. First, that research 
that analyzes the link of SRI techniques and financial performance is understudied within the 
Canadian market. Second, and more specifically, there are no studies that have analyzed 
Canadian broad market fund performance utilizing industry specific techniques for climate 
change in respect to carbon emissions within the academic community. Notably, this literature 
review discovered that there is a research gap in understanding if the broad Canadian equity 
market is equipped and can be utilized to fund a lower carbon society. As discussed previously, if 
Canada chooses to adhere to its climate change targets, action needs to be taken and the public 
equity markets can be a mechanism used. Next the objectives for the research will be outlined, 
followed by the research questions and hypotheses. 
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3.1 Objectives 
The study has the following objectives: 
 -­‐ To investigate and understand how an investor within the Canadian equity markets can 
invest while considering Canada’s climate change targets. -­‐ To better understand the link between environmental SRI and financial performance -­‐ To provide more research in the field of socially responsible investing for academics and 
industry analysts with an interest in the Canadian equity markets. -­‐ To understand if an investor interested in investing within the Canadian equity markets 
can mitigate their risks from climate change, specifically pertaining to carbon emissions. -­‐ To determine if an investor can re-allocate their capital to aid in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, specifically lower carbon solutions.  -­‐ To educate investors in understanding risk must consider more factors than price 
volatility alone. There are other drivers of risk that can be quantified and used for 
investment criterion. -­‐ To further understand if the Canadian equity markets are currently a mechanism investors 
can use to allocate their capital to fund a sustainable future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Research Question and Hypotheses 
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The two research questions and hypotheses derived from the research gaps are as follows:  
 
1. Does divesting from Canada’s S&P/TSX Composite index as an investment strategy 
financially underperform?  
H0: Divesting from Canada’s S&P/TSX Composite index as an investment strategy 
financially underperforms relative to the S&P/TSX Composite benchmark.  
H1: Divesting from Canada’s S&P/TSX Composite index as an investment strategy does not 
financially underperform relative to the S&P/TSX Composite benchmark. 
 
Divestment here is in reference to the fossil fuel free divestment movement. 
 
2. Does using carbon emission metrics as an investment strategy financially outperform?  
H0: Using a carbon emission metric as an investment strategy financially underperforms 
relative to the benchmark universe.  
H1: Using a carbon emission metric as an investment strategy does not financially 
underperform relative to the benchmark universe.  
 
Carbon metrics here are used to create a best in-class portfolio, creating a portfolio with the 
most efficient companies against their sub-industry peers. The universe benchmark was the 
market capped weighted benchmark of the companies that disclosed carbon footprint data 
annually.  
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4 Methods 
4.1 General Methodology 
 
Using a quantitative research approach, this study seeks to provide more information for 
portfolio managers and investors in the equity markets who consider carbon emissions a concern 
within their investment criteria. This research uses a quantitative approach because the methods 
and results are framed around numeric variables to be analyzed using statistical procedures. This 
thesis also holds assumptions grounded in portfolio theory and thus uses a deductive approach to 
protect against bias. The methods, including assumptions and limitations, are explained below.  
 
A post-positivist worldview is the dominant paradigm that provided influence for how the 
questions and methods were selected. “Post-positivists hold a deterministic philosophy in which 
causes (probably) determine effects or outcomes. It is also reductionist in that the intent is to 
reduce the ideas into a small, discrete set to test, such as the variables that comprise hypotheses 
and research questions” (Creswell, 2014, 7).  In this paper two assumptions are held: 1. investing 
into a portfolio with lower carbon emissions will afford less exposure to the risks associated with 
the use of carbon, and 2. by divesting from the fossil fuel and utility sectors one can mitigate risks 
from fossil fuel industries while supporting a lower carbon future. The variables, and the 
relationships among variables, will be tested (explained in greater depth shortly) to produce 
objective evidence that can be brought back into the real world for application; another belief 
held by post-positivists. Within this worldview, data, evidence, and rational considerations shape 
our knowledge.  
 
It is worthwhile to note here that this thesis draws heavily from financial theory and the 
methods that are used within the industry. This thesis, therefore, applies the necessary statistics 
that are related to such an analysis. The statistics used within the results section are typical to 
what would be used within quantitative finance stock return analysis with the additional layer of 
applying the Carhart model for return attribution. This analysis is not attempting to predict the 
future value of a portfolio return with a certain investment strategy (ie. evaluating the information 
coefficients) but rather analyzing a strategy with regard to perceived risk and moral ideologies, 
then analyzing the return performance.   
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Figure 4-1 displays the two main constructs that were derived from predominant theories 
discussed within the literature review that pertain to the research questions and hypotheses; that 
is, environmental SRI and financial performance. The variables that operationalize these 
constructs are divestment strategy, carbon emissions strategy and the resulting cumulative return.  
This analysis uses the divestment and carbon emissions strategies as the independent variables to 
test the effect on the cumulative return, the dependent variable. To clarify, by applying a 
divestment strategy or carbon emission strategy to an initial fund (or universe), this study tests the 
performance of this fund relative to the initial fund by looking at the effect on cumulative return 
performance relative to the initial fund (also known as the benchmark).  
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Figure 4-1: Constructs, Operationalization, IV and DV
 
 
(Creswell, 2014). 
Where Environmental SRI is defined as the strategies that embrace the moral and ethical 
ideologies and risk concern of investors who are concerned about climate change with respect to 
carbon emissions. Financial performance is defined as the financial returns of investments in 
companies from share ownership. The variables and sub variables will be described in detail in 
the following section, explaining how they are defined and quantified. 
 
Figure 4-2 displays the general steps that were used for the methods, which correspond to the 
headings in this section of the paper. The main goal within the methods section is to clearly 
outlay the process in which the divestment and high/low emissions portfolios were created to 
provide a well-defined understanding how a researcher or an investor could approach these 
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strategies themselves. The steps are presented in the chronological order in which the research 
was conducted to aid readers in understanding any boundaries encountered during the research.  
 
Figure 4-2: Methodology Steps 
 
 
4.2 Step 1: Data - Universe and Time Period 
4.2.1 Canadian	  Equity	  Universe	  
 
The choice to use the Canadian equity market versus other country markets and assets, such 
as the United States and fixed income securities, was fourfold: i) it is the country where the 
research is being conducted, thus this research has the opportunity to gain greater value for both 
industry analysts and the surrounding academic community; ii) the Canadian market is 
understudied (this was addressed in the literature review above); iii) equity is the asset class that 
is the focus of the divestment movement and has been predominantly used for carbon emission 
quantification; iv) most importantly, the non-renewable energy sector is heavily over-weighted in 
the Canadian market compared to the global equity market, perhaps making the transition for 
capital support to cleaner energy and a lower carbon society more difficult. 
 
Step	  6:	  Carbon	  Emissions	  -­‐	  Portfolio	  Creation	  (Benchmark,	  High/Low	  Emissions	  Portfolios)	  
Step	  5:	  Model	  Creation	  (Carhart	  Model	  and	  Carbon	  Emissions	  Model)	  
Step	  4:	  Divestment	  -­‐	  Portfolio	  Creation	  (Benchmark	  Portfolio	  and	  Sub-­‐Index	  Portfolios)	  
Step	  3:	  Scrubbing	  the	  Data	  (Database	  Combining	  Issues,	  Coverage	  Issues,	  and	  Resampling)	  
Step	  2:	  Data	  -­‐	  Sources	  and	  Data	  Items	  
Step	  1:	  Data	  -­‐	  Universe	  &	  Time	  Period	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As of January 29th 2016, the S&P/TSX 60 was overweighted 12.9% and 18.8% in the energy 
and financial sector, respectively against the S&P Global 1200 (shown in table 4-1). The S&P 
Global 1200 captures approximately 70% of the global market capitalization and is a combination 
of the top 7 major indices. This includes: S&P 500 (United States), S&P/TSX 60 (Canada), 
S&P/ASX All Australian 50, S&P Asia 50 and S&P Latin America 40. The S&P/TSX 60 is an 
index that captures the large capitalization segment of the Canadian market. It is structured to 
reflect similar sector weights to that of the S&P/TSX Composite Index.  
 
Table 4-1 : Sector Breakdowns: S&P/TSX Composite vs. S&P Global 
Sectors 
S&P Global 
1200 
S&P/TSX 
60 
Over / Under 
Weight 
Consumer Discretionary 12.4% 6.6% -5.8% 
Consumer Staples 10.7% 5.2% -5.5% 
Energy 6.3% 19.2% 12.9% 
Financials 20.5% 39.3% 18.8% 
Health Care 13.2% 3.4% -9.8% 
Industrials 10.8% 7.4% -3.4% 
Information Technology 14.9% 7.3% -7.6% 
Materials 4.4% 8.3% 3.9% 
Telecom Services 3.7% 7.3% 3.6% 
Utilities 3.1% 0.9% -2.2% 
(S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016). 
*As at December 31st, 2015 
 
The S&P/TSX Composite index is the broadest index in Canada; it is the basis for numerous 
sub-indices (including the S&P/TSX 60), which breakdown the market by different factors such 
as size and global industry classification standards. It is comprised of common stocks and income 
trust units, and maintains liquidity characteristics of narrower indices. The S&P/TSX SmallCap 
Index is separate to the S&P/TSX Composite and its sub-indices because many stocks that fall 
within this index do not meet the minimal requirements of the Composite index and the index 
also does not follow a similar sector composition. To be eligible for inclusion in the Composite a 
security must meet two main requirements: i) Market Capitalization: based upon volume 
weighted average price (VWAP) the security must have a minimum weight of .05% over the last 
three trading days of prior month-end and the security must have a VWAP of one dollar Canadian 
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over the past three months and over the last three trading days of the prior month before quarterly 
review; ii) Liquidity: must be .5 for eligibility. “The unique combination makes the S&P/TSX 
Composite Index ideal for portfolio management and index replication” (TMX Money, 2015, 1). 
 
The S&P/TSX Composite index was chosen as the investible universe because it is the 
broadest index to reflect the overall Canadian equity universe, approximately 70% of all market 
capitalization. The S&P/TSX 60 index is used by many Canadian investors as a benchmark 
because it is structured to offer many similarities to that of the Composite index but when 
choosing the universe for stock selection the Composite offers more diversification by simply 
having more stock to choose from. Albeit, the S&P/TSX SmallCap index does contain securities 
that are considered liquid-able; this index was not chosen because it would only capture a fraction 
of the market and data availability for pricing can be very difficult. The investible securities 
within S&P/TSX SmallCap will be considered for reinvestment options for portfolio 
construction. Additionally, to avoid survivorship bias, all securities that were within the index at a 
point and time where priced and considered regardless if a security eventually fell out of the 
S&P/TSX Composite or were delisted. 
 
4.2.2 Time	  Period	  	  
The time period chosen looks backward five-years from the date data collection took place. 
Therefore, the data collected encapsulates the time period 09/30/2010-08/31/2015. As will be 
discussed in the Data Issues section below, there were significant problems with the data prior to 
the 2011 period, therefore, the final time period used for analysis was revised to 01/31/2011-
08/31/2015.  
 
4.3 Step 2: Collecting Data - Sources and Items 
4.3.1 Constituent	  Information:	  Funddata	  Canada	  Inc.	  
	  
To receive the constituent holdings information for the S&P/TSX Composite index 
throughout the historical period one has to go through a data provider that has index constituent 
information. Funddata Canada Inc. offers a variety of products and services, one of which being 
their fund database. This company compiles and analyzes many funds within the Canadian 
market including exchange-traded funds (ETFs).  An ETF is a type of fund that tracks an index 
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and can be traded on an exchange. Although there is not an ETF that tracks that S&P/TSX 
Composite Index, there are funds that track the S&P/TSX 60 and the S&P/TSX Completion 
index. When these two are combined they mimic the same constituents holdings as the S&P/TSX 
Composite. A data request was sent to Fund Data to receive the ETF constituents, security names, 
and ticker information, monthly ETF prices and Fund Data key (to differentiate between ETFs) of 
both the iShares S&P/TSX 60 and the iShares S&P/TSX Completion index funds for the five-
year time period stated above. In exchange for a free license and the ability to use the data for a 
master’s thesis and academic publications, an agreement was made to create two 750-word 
reports that summarize the findings of the research. Lastly, to ensure that in fact, these two ETF’s 
did mimic the overall return of the S&P Composite index, the monthly return for the two ETF 
prices should yield the same result. Figure 4-3 below displays the ETF Combined Return against 
the S&P/TSX Composite Index Return (the data source for the S&P/TSX Price Return will be 
explained below). 
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Figure 4-3: S&P/TSX Composite Cumulative Price Return vs. ETF Combined Cumulative Price 
Return 
 
(S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016) 
4.3.2 Fundamental	  Information:	  WRDS	  (Compustat)	  
 
There are numerous open source websites to receive pricing information for securities such as 
Google finance or TMX Money. These sites lack the reliability of accurate pricing information 
and also do not provide historical balance sheet and income statement information that is 
pertinent to the analysis. Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) is a database provider that is 
free for graduate students at the University of Waterloo and was used for the analysis. WRDS 
provides access to Compustat’s security pricing and company information that is owned by S&P 
Capital IQ and is accurate and reliable. This database was used for the following information: 
security month end prices, global industry classification standard (GICS) codes, common shares 
outstanding monthly, total assets, total liabilities, total preferred shares, float shares outstanding 
monthly, Compustat ticker (CAD), currency exchange rate for US dollar to Canadian conversion, 
and security name. The descriptions for each data item can be found in Table 4-2 below. All 
balance sheet and income statement items were on a quarterly basis and resampled to reflect 
month end dates. To account for a lookback bias, the most recent quarterly figure that was 
released, such as on December 31st, 2013, has been used as the figure for January and February as 
well. Point in time data, also produced by Compustat, is the most reliable to address types of 
lookback and resample issues, however, the University of Waterloo does not have access to these 
databases.  
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Table 4-2 : Data Items and Descriptions 
Data Item Description 
Monthly end pricing (PRCCM) This item contains the absolute close market 
prices for each calendar month.  
Shares Outstanding Monthly - Issue (CSHOM) Common shares outstanding, presented on a 
month end basis 
Common Stock Float Shares -Canada Common Stock Float Shares represent all 
common shares outstanding less controlled 
block shares as of month-end. 
Global Industry Classification Codes: 
GIC Groups (GGROUP) 
GIC Industries (GIND) 
GIC Sector (GSECTOR) 
GIC Sub-Industries (GSUBIND) 
Items representing the first, second, third and 
fourth level of the hierarchies. 
Assets – total (AT)* This represents the total assets/liabilities of a 
company at a point in time 
Liabilities – total (LTQ) U.S. and Canadian GAAP definition. This 
items represents the current plus long-term debt 
plus other noncurrent liabilities, including 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
Preferred/ Preference Stock (Capital)- total 
(PSTK) 
U.S. and Canadian GAAP definition. This item 
represents the net number of preferred shares at 
year-end multiplied by the par of stated value 
per share as presented in the company’s 
Balance Sheet. 
Compustat Ticker  This items identifies the symbol associated 
with trading of a particular issue on an 
exchange 
Company Name This identifies the company for which data is 
presented.  
Revenue- Total (REVT) 
 
This item represents the gross income received 
from all divisions of the company, it is a 
component of pre-tax income 
Fiscal Year End (FYR) This identifies the month in which a company 
ends its fiscal year.  
US Canadian Translation Rate (CURUSCN) The rate of exchange used to translate CAD 
currencies into USD amounts. For companies 
reporting in both U.S. and Canadian accounting 
standards, Federal Reserve period rates. 
(WRDS, 2016). 
 
For transparency, it is worthwhile to further outline here the GICS classification codes. These 
will be used throughout the divestment process and for sector analysis within the results section. 
Table 4-3 highlights the names for each GICS hierarchy and associated code. The energy and 
utility sectors are fully expanded through to Sub-Industry level of the GICS hierarchy, as they 
will be the focus for divestment.  
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Table 4-3: Global Industry Classification Standards 
Sector Industry Group Industry Sub-Industry 
10 Energy 1010 Energy 101010 Energy 
Equipment & 
Services 
10101010 Oil & Gas Drilling 
10101020 Integrated Oil & Gas 
101020 Oil, Gas 
& Consumable 
Fuels 
10102010 Integrated Oil & Gas 
10102020 Oil & Gas Exploration 
& Production 
10102030 Oil & Gas Refining & 
Marketing 
10102040 Oil & Gas Storage & 
Transportation 
10102050 Coal & Consumable 
Fuels 
15 Materials 1510 Materials  
20 Industrials 2010 Capital Goods 
2020 Commercial & 
Professional Services 
2030 Transportation 
25 Consumer 
Discretionary 
2510 Automobiles & 
Components 
 
2520 Consumer 
Durables & Apparel 
2530 Consumer 
Services 
2540 Media 
2550 Retailing 
30 Consumer 
Staples 
3010 Food & Staples 
Retailing 
 
3020 Food, Beverage & 
Tobacco 
3030 Household & 
Personal Products 
35 Health 
Care 
3510 Health Care 
Equipment & Services 
 
3520 Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology & Life 
Sciences 
40 Financials 4010 Banks  
4020 Diversified 
Financials 
4030 Insurance 
4040 Real Estate 
45 
Information 
Technology 
4510 Software & 
Services 
 
4520 Technology 
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Hardware & Equipment 
4530 Semiconductors 
& Semiconductor 
Equipment 
50 Telecom. 
Services 
5010 Telecom. Services  
55 Utilities 5510 Utilities  551010 Electric  55101010 Electric  
551020 Gas  55102010 Gas  
551030 Multi-
Utilities 
55103010 Multi-Utilities 
551040 Water 55104010 Water 
551050 
Independent 
Power & 
Renewable 
Electricity 
Producers 
55105010 Independent Power 
Producers & Energy Traders 
55105020 Renewable Electricity 
* Effective after business close on February 28th, 2014 
(S&P Capital IQ, 2016). 
 
4.3.3 Carbon	  Emissions	  Data:	  CDP	  and	  Bloomberg	  
 
Greenhouse gas emission data for each company was also needed for the analysis. Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) motivates companies and cities to voluntarily disclosure their 
environmental impacts such as total greenhouse gas emissions and water usage to give decision 
makers the data they need to change market behavior. They are considered the largest source of 
free data for company level emissions and will be used for the analysis here. CDP sends an 
information request to the largest 200 Canadian companies by market capitalization, on behalf of 
a large group of institutional investors (signatories), with cumulative assets over trillions of 
dollars, to report their greenhouse gas emissions and other pertinent information. This data is 
compiled into an annual report produced by CDP and only companies that voluntarily issue this 
information and opt in for their information to be public can be found within the reports. The 
emission data that was used in this analysis includes scope 1 and scope 2 emissions. Scope 3 
emissions were not used because they is a lot of missing data, and the data is unreliable, they do 
not have adequate guidelines on how to properly scope these set of emissions. GHG data will be 
referred to carbon data at many points throughout this analysis and will be assumed to be the 
carbon emissions equivalent to the amount of GHG emissions.  
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Given CDP’s voluntary nature, it was worthwhile to seek out other institutions that provide 
company level GHG data. MSCI was contacted, however, their data cannot be accessed without a 
paid license. Corporate Knights, a media and research company that includes an award winning 
business and society magazine, has access to GHG data and was able to provide free access to 
their Bloomberg data set. The Corporate Knights data also included scope 1 and scope 2 
emissions and included different companies than that of CDP (as will be shown below). 
Corporate Knights also, in some cases, verified that the data was correct with companies by either 
extracting the information from annual reports or being directly provided with the data. 
4.3.4 Index	  Level	  Pricing:	  S&P	  Dow	  Jones	  Indices	  
 
Index level pricing data was used within the analysis for index creation, comparison, 
benchmarking, and re-investment options. S&P Dow Jones Indices have a downloadable option 
for S&P/TSX Composite index total price level month end (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016). This 
was used while ensuring that two ETF’s matched the same overall return, whether it be by 
combining the two ETF prices or aggregating the price of the individual securities (which is 
shown below). Additionally, S&P/TSX offers indices, such as S&P/TSX Renewable Energy and 
Clean Technology Index that measures the performance of companies listed on the TSX whose 
primary business is the development of green technologies and sustainable infrastructure 
solutions. An independent data analytic provider, Sustainalytics, who focuses on environmental, 
social, and government research and analysis, screens these constituents. The data for the index 
level month end prices was retrieved from the S&P Dow Jones Indices website (S&P Dow Jones 
Indices, 2016). This price level data was used to measure the returns for re-investments purposes.  
 
4.4 Step 3: Scrubbing the Data 
4.4.1 Database	  Combining	  Issues:	  Fund	  Data	  and	  Compustat	  	  
 
The intention of requesting the ticker identifications for every constituent was for it to be the 
unique identifier that could match the securities within the Fund Data file to the Compustat 
database. Fund Data gathers ticker information from the providers of the ETF’s and entrusts that 
they record and provide all ticker information. Some tickers, however, were missing and were not 
always correct. Additionally, Compustat records their tickers not as they appear on the exchanges 
but by their stock characteristics, such as non-conventional voting rights or a delisting. The ticker 
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symbol that would normally appear on an exchange, such as IBM, would receive a ticker symbol 
listing as IBM.Z if it is delisted, and to search for the security information IBM.Z would have to 
be used. These odd occurrences would inhibit the databases to have a full one to one matching. 
But the most notable ticker symbol alterations that Compustat uses is when a ticker symbol is 
used for both a U.S. and Canadian exchange, the Canadian ticker symbol is appended with a ‘.’. 
Additionally, the unit trusts were not recorded the same. Within Fund Data they were recorded 
with ‘.U’ whereas the Compustat Data recorded it with a ‘.UN’. This became a major problem for 
the way that mapping needed to be conducted.    
 
The Fund Data ticker symbols were used in conjunction with the security name to find the 
applicable ticker symbol and security name within the Compustat database. The remaining 
identifiers that were not found by using the standardized join approach was searched for directly 
by ticker symbol within the Compustat database to find the applicable symbol. If the ticker 
symbol could not be found by searching within the Compustat database, the ticker was found 
through a Google finance search. There were many company names that have been changed or 
companies that were acquired by other companies and the current name was found through 
Google search. Such companies’ ticker symbols were pulled out of the Compustat security name 
search. These security prices were then cross-checked on Google Finance to ensure that the price 
accurately reflected that security price at that point in time.  
 
After completing the steps to find the ticker symbol corresponding to the security name, if a 
historical price was not found, it was determined that it was best to leave the constituent on that 
date out of the data set, rather than to add it with the incorrect price. To ensure that the 
constituents would minimally affect the overall index the percentage holdings were totaled. In 
Table 4-4 below, the number of constituents and the percentage of the market total was 
calculated. The market total is out of 200% due to the factors that i) the weighting of each ETF 
totaled 100% and ii) this is the two ETF’s combined. Although this calculation is inaccurate, it 
was used primarily as an approximation of how much of the S&P/TSX Composite market 
portfolio would be missing. The dates from 09/30/10-12/31/2010 have more than 20 companies 
and were thought to be unrepresentative of the S&P Composite Index.  
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Table 4-4: Number of Missing Constituents 
Date 
# of 
Companies 
Missing 
Information 
Market % 
total Date 
# of 
Companies 
Missing 
Information 
Market % 
total 
1/31/11 14 6.65 7/31/12 2 0.86 
2/28/11 9 4.69 8/31/12 3 0.4 
3/31/11 2 0.92 9/30/12 4 0.91 
4/30/11 4 2.07 10/31/12 4 2.49 
5/31/11 1 0.3 11/30/12 3 0.41 
6/30/11 1 0.19 12/31/12 3 0.41 
7/31/11 1 0.19 1/31/13 3 0.4 
8/31/11 1 0.18 2/28/13 2 0.21 
9/30/11 3 0.43 3/31/13 2 0.55 
10/31/11 3 0.43 4/30/13 1 0.23 
12/31/11 4 2.36 5/31/13 1 0.23 
1/31/12 2 1.18 6/30/13 1 0.23 
2/29/12 2 1.18 7/31/13 1 0.23 
3/31/12 3 1.55 8/31/13 1 0.22 
4/30/12 3 1.25 9/30/13 1 0.23 
5/31/12 5 1.99 10/31/13 1 0.25 
6/30/12 3 1 11/30/13 1 0.27 
7/31/12 2 0.86 3/31/14 1 0.22 
8/31/12 3 0.4 4/30/14 2 0.41 
9/30/12 4 0.91 5/31/14 1 0.2 
10/31/12 4 2.49 6/30/14 1 0.14 
11/30/12 3 0.41 12/31/14 1 0.68 
12/31/12 3 0.41 8/31/15 1 0.27 
 
4.4.2 Coverage	  Issues:	  Carbon	  Data	  
 
The greenhouse gas data provided by CDP had coverage issues given the voluntary nature of 
the data, which is why another source, Bloomberg, was sought out and used in conjunction with 
CDP. Table 4-5 outlines the number of reporting disclosures for CDP, which justifies seeking out 
another data provider was useful for greater coverage. As displayed, the coverage increased on 
average by 8.8%.  
 
 50 
Table 4-5 Company Disclosures and Coverage 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
# of CDP Data  84 80 74  73 61 
# of CDP + Bloomberg* 91 96 109 95 86 
 # of S&P/TSX Constituents** 247 241 232 252 241 
% Coverage (CDP) 34% 33% 32% 30% 25% 
% Coverage (CDP + Bloomberg) 37% 40% 47% 38% 36% 
* The number of constituents for the fiscal year end.  
** The number of constituents at March end of the following year.  
 
To avoid a look-ahead bias when understanding the investment returns from a portfolio 
management perspective, the carbon data needed to be resampled to appear at a time when the 
data would be reasonably available to the public. Therefore, the number of constituents within the 
S&P/TSX Composite, which represents when the carbon data is available for investment 
purposes, is for the end of March of the year after the fiscal year. For example, for the fiscal year 
2011, the coverage for the carbon emissions data against the number of constituents in the index 
are for March 2012. A three-month time lag was chosen because it is a standard industry 
approach, used within the U.S. markets.  Since the SEC deadline for filing out the 10-K form is 
90 days (SPCapital IQ, 2015) and many Canadian companies trade on United States exchanges, 
this approach was taken. This approach was also used for the total revenue data that will be 
incorporated into the low carbon portfolios investment process (this will be explained in greater 
length below). 
4.4.3 Resampling	  Data:	  Carbon	  Emissions	  
 
Standardization on how companies report are rising; the Greenhouse Gas Protocol for 15 
years has provided guidance to companies on how to homogenize the way they calculate their 
GHG emissions. Most companies in 2014 that reported to CDP use this approach, allowing CDP 
to estimate and compare the carbon footprint for companies and their value chains (Greenhouse 
Gas Protocol, 2014). These GHG emission accounting standards allow for metric matching across 
methodology providers and are not concerning as long as one controls for external factors such as 
currency of portfolio, time of reporting, and scope (Greenhouse Gas Protocol, 2015; IIGCC, 
2015). As noted previously, both data providers used scope 1 and scope 2 and all currency is in 
CAD.  The remaining issue of the time of reporting will be discussed here. 
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CDP’s reporting year is reflective of the current reporting year and is the latest/most recent 
12-month period for which the data is reported. This data does not have to be aligned to a 
company’s fiscal year (CDP, 2016). For example, CDP requests companies to report their 
emissions for the 2015 calendar year. The Bloomberg data, received from Corporate Knights, 
accounts for their data by fiscal period.  For example, the data could be from March 2014-
February 2015 for the 2014 fiscal year. The period end difference amongst the two providers 
causes two problems: lag issues and reporting versus fiscal year end issue. 
 
Lag issues: As noted above, when understanding return data from a portfolio management 
perspective, both the revenue and GHG data for a fiscal year period will have a lag of 3 months 
(at a minimum) to show when the data would have been available to investors in real-time 
(preventing look-ahead bias). Fiscal month end varies; for the fiscal year 2010 a company can 
have a fiscal year end anywhere from July 1st 2010 – June 30th 2011. Therefore, if Bloomberg 
data were to be used, any company that had a fiscal year ending in January to June would need to 
be resampled to reflect the following fiscal year. For example, Open Text Corporation reports 
their fiscal year end in June so the fiscal period 2010 ending in June 2011, will be resampled to 
March 2012. Given that Bloomberg’s methodology more accurately reflects how the revenue is 
reported (it follows the same methodology on how the revenue is recorded for fiscal year ends), 
Bloomberg data has been used as the primary source and CDP has been used to fill in any missing 
data. Although, only 6 companies of the 120 that disclosed GHG emissions over the five-year 
period had a fiscal period that ended in January to June, both the GHG data and the revenue data 
were resampled to represent this approach for the carbon emission portfolio analysis.  
 
Reporting versus fiscal year end issue: A total of 17 of the 120 companies that submitted 
GHG data had a fiscal year end other December. Bloomberg data was always chosen first because 
total revenue is also calculated with the fiscal year approach. Therefore, the emissions data would 
still be aligned to the period in which the revenue was generated from the emissions output. The 
Bloomberg dataset had information for the 17 companies. 
 
By adjusting for both the lag issues and the reporting year versus fiscal year end issues all 
emissions and revenues were aligned and have been lagged 3 months to prevent look ahead bias.  
4.5 Step 4: Divestment - Portfolio Creation Calculation 
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Prior to creating the sub-index portfolios, to verify that the pricing data retrieved through the 
Compustat database corresponded to the correct tickers and that the missing data did not create an 
index overall price return difference that was statistically significant, the price levels (float shares 
outstanding * price) were summated and the cumulative returns were calculated. In Figure 4-4 the 
cumulative returns had a correlation of .98% (where equation 4-1 was used for the calculation of 
cumulative returns). Therefore, the differences amongst the calculated benchmark versus the real 
benchmark are statistically insignificant and the prices retrieved from the Compustat database 
were accurate.   
 
Figure 4-4: Calculated Index versus S&P/TSX Composite Index 
 
(S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016). 
Equation 4-1: Cumulative Returns were calculates as:  
 (𝐹𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃! −   𝐹𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃 !!! )𝐹𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃(!!!) − .0001 
 
Where FMCAP equals the total float shares outstanding on date n multiplied by price at date 
n and .001 is the index deflator.  
 
This price return calculation used the same approach of S&P Dow Jones Indices but within 
this calculation a deflator was used instead of an index divisor since the index divisor is 
proprietary information of the company. “Continuity in index values is maintained by adjusting 
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the divisor for all changes in the constituents’ share capital after the base date. This includes 
additions and deletions to the index, right issues, share buybacks and issuances, and spin-offs. 
The divisor’s time series is, in effect, a chronological summary of all changes affecting the base 
capital of the index.” (SP Dow Jones Indices, 2016). Additionally, the divisor allows the price 
value of the index to have a value that is reasonable to articulate to day-to-day traders (i.e., 
12,483 versus 1,093,314). Given these limitations, the index divisor was not calculated as no 
formula could be found and rather an index deflator of .001 was used.  
 
It is worthwhile to note that an alternative way to calculate portfolio returns, which is the 
most common approach for portfolio investors, is to find the unit price return of the security and 
multiply it by the weight (MCAP weight) of that constituent in the portfolio, then summate these 
values for all the constituents within the portfolio. This calculation is another robust way to 
calculate portfolio returns. As with the calculation of the index divisor, however, this 
methodology becomes erroneous when trying to smooth out and account for all share buybacks, 
new releases and stock splits. If a granular portfolio attribution analysis was needed, such as 
which stocks outperformed versus underperformed versus the benchmark, then these calculations 
would be required, however, it is sufficient to have one calculation. The CFA Institute is an 
association of investment professionals that offers a CFA designation, which is a standardized 
measurement of your investment knowledge. They provide the following calculation, (Equation 
4-2 and Equation 4-3) that proves that the price return of the index is the same as that of the sum 
of the price return of the individual securities, market capped weighted.  
 
Equation 4-2: Calculation of Single-Period Price Return 
 
(CFA Institute, 2015) 
Where PRI  = the price return of index portfolio I, PRi = the price return of constituent 
security I, wi = the weight of security I, Pi1= the price of constituent security i at the end of the 
period, Pi0= the price of constituent security i at the beginning of the period. 
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(CFA Institute, 2015) 
Where VPRI = the value of the price return index, ni = the number of units of constituent 
securities in the index, N = the number of constituent securities in the index, Pi = the unit price of 
constituent security I and D = the value of the divisor. 
 
The prices level of each portfolio will be used going forward for the calculation of the 
portfolio returns. Additionally, the synthetic benchmark will be used and be called the S&P/TSX 
Composite Index going forward to offer consistency of portfolio statistics against the benchmark, 
such as active return and active risk.  
4.5.1 Sub	  Index	  Portfolios	  
 
The varying approaches to divestment were applied. Six sub-index portfolios were created an 
are as follows:  
1. Coal Divestment: Divestment from the companies with the categorization of coal sub-
industry classification. This encompasses companies that are primarily involved in the 
production and mining of coal, related products, and other consumable fuels related to the 
generation of energy.  
2. Coal + Energy Equipment and Services Divestment: Using portfolio 1 as the investment 
universe, divestment from companies with the energy equipment and services industry 
classification. 
3. Coal + divestment from Carbon Underground 200: Using portfolio 1 as the investment 
universe, divestment from the Canadian based companies listed on the Carbon 
Underground’s Top 2015 List (Fossil Fuel Free Indexes, 2015). A list of these companies and 
their total reserves can be found in Appendix A. These companies account for 8.008 Gt CO2 
total coal, gas and oil reserve emissions potential.  
4. Coal + Oil Gas and Consumable Fuels: Divestment from the companies with coal and oil, 
gas and consumable fuels industry classification. 
5. Energy Sector Divestment: Divestment from the companies with the energy sector 
classification. 
6. Energy + Utilities Divestment: Divestment from the companies with the energy or utilities 
sector classification, excluding companies with the renewable energy GICS sub-industry 
classification.  
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The sub-index portfolios were used to demonstrate the comparable return and risk profile of a 
step-by-step divestment approach to the energy and utility sector. The first case assumes a 100 
percent equal re-investment into the companies remaining within the portfolio. The second case 
assumes a re-investment into companies that are considered to have a core business that is the 
development of green technologies and sustainable infrastructure solutions, which was done by 
investing into the S&P/TSX Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Index (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 
2016). These constituents are chosen by Sustainalytics, a global responsible investment research 
firm (Sustainalytics, 2016). Both of these classifications are very limiting within the GICS sector 
classification standards. Only companies that engage in the generation and distribution of 
electricity using renewable sources or companies that provide environmental and facilities 
maintenance services such as waste management and pollution control services receive a 
classification that differentiates their core business amongst others. Companies that manufacture 
capital equipment used to generate electricity using renewable sources or companies that provide 
environmental data tracking and management services do not have a different classification from 
their non-renewable manufacturing competitors.   The stocks are selected from the TSX investible 
universe and include many small cap stocks within the industrial and utilities sector, as displayed 
within Table 4-6. 
 
Table 4-6: Sector Breakdown of Clean Index vs. Composite Index 
  Weight   
  S&P/TSX Composite 
S&P/TSX 
Renewable Energy 
and Clean Tech 
Index 
Over/ Under 
Weight 
Consumer 
Discretionary 6.9%  - - 
Consumer Staples 4.5% 3.6% -0.9% 
Energy 18.5% 1.4% -17.1% 
Financials 38.3%  - - 
Health Care 3.2%   -3.2% 
Industrials 8.3% 22.8% 14.5% 
Information 
Technology 3.2% 2.1% -1.1% 
Materials 9.5% 6.8% -2.7% 
Telecom. Services 5.4%  - - 
Utilities 2.3% 63.2% -0.8% 
*As of January 29th 2016. 
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This index comprises 20 companies that have a strategic commitment to five environmental 
themes: i) renewable energy for production and distribution; ii) renewable energy for 
manufacturing and technologies; iii) energy efficiency; iv) waste reduction; and, v) water 
management, and low impact materials and products (ie. organic foods). It focuses on companies 
that reduce the throughput pressures on the ecological system when providing goods or services 
to global markets. The constituents throughout the time period chosen were unavailable for free, 
only the current constituents were available. A cross-reference of stocks was completed to note 
the overlap with constituents that were being divested or are remaining in the portfolio (i.e., that 
are within the S&P/TSX Composite index). Of the constituents held on February 25th, 2016, 
seven were within the S&P/TSX Composite, four being companies that were divested from 
within the sub portfolios (to note: three were within the independent power producers, and energy 
traders sub-industry). This demonstrates that this GICS classification needs be divided amongst 
environmentally responsible and non-responsible business types and would have not be divested 
from in the first place if the GICS were clearer. Lastly, the S&P/TSX Renewable and Clean Tech 
index will be referred to as the green index, and will act as an ETF (exchange traded fund) in the 
way that re-investment will only occur within how the index is created, mimicking the overall 
return.  
 
Taking the value of what was divested, and re-investing that capital into the green index each 
month accomplished the re-investment into the green index. For example, if the energy sector 
divestment for January was 24% of the overall TSX Composite index, 24% of portfolio return 
would be generated from the green index return and 76% would be generated from the energy 
divestment portfolio. It is similar to 76% of the holdings being invested into the “energy sector 
divestment portfolio” and 24% being invested in the green index. The formula is displayed below. 
 
Equation 4-4: Divested and Re-invested Portfolio Return 
 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛!!! = 𝑟!𝑤! + 𝑟!𝑤! 
 
Where r1 is the return of the divested portfolio, w1 is the weight of the divested portfolio 
against the benchmark portfolio, r2 is the return of the green index, and w2 is the weight of the 
benchmark portfolio less the divested portfolio. w1+w2=100%, and is the month n=1,…..,55. 
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4.6 Step 5: Model Creation 
4.6.1 Carhart	  Model	  
 
As discussed earlier, capital asset pricing models are renowned for asset pricing of theoretical 
returns of a security or portfolio; a way to measure the systematic and unsystematic risk.  Before 
describing the model creation and the how each factor within the model is defined, a brief 
explanation for the chosen model was needed.  
 
To review, the capital asset pricing model created, established by William Sharpe and Linter 
in the 1960’s, was arguably the first asset-pricing model used at a large scale. It states that one 
factor, the risk premium, is sufficient to explain the cross-section of expected returns. Later, 
Kenneth French and Eugene Fama contended the validity of this model, stating that in fact, two 
more factors, SMB and HML, are needed to reliably explain the returns (Fama and French 1993). 
Lastly, the Carhart 4-factor model was created, adding one more factor: 12-month price 
momentum, MOM.  
 
Carhart demonstrates that persistence in mutual funds within the US markets does not reflect 
superior stock-picking skill, but common factors in stock returns and differences amongst the 
expenses and transaction costs (another reason why expenses and transaction costs are omitted 
from this analysis). The most well-known study collected all available mutual fund data from 
1962 to 1993. For comparison, the mean absolute errors from the CAPM, 3-factor, and 4-factor 
models were .35%, .31%, 14%, respectively (Carhart, 1997). This demonstrates that using the 4-
factor model helps explain a significant amount more of the mutual fund returns of this period 
than that of the other models and was attested to be the new model for investment managers 
deploying style investment strategies. There are two underlying issues of this study that does not 
make it applicable for investment managers to use worldwide today. First, the sample is 
comprised of mutual funds within the US, so it is country specific. Second, if a large amount of 
investment managers implemented this strategy in the US or elsewhere, this model would not be 
as effective. But nonetheless, it is useful to use within the analysis to use so investors can have an 
interpretation of the attribution of the portfolio returns. Both the CAPM and Carhart model will 
be created and tested to further understand the return attribution and predictably of the portfolio 
returns.  
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The Carhart model was calculated as:  
Risk premium: The excess market return. The benchmark return less the risk free rate. 
The risk free rate is measured by the 1 month Treasury bill issued by the Government of 
Canada. 
SML:  The return of the small cap portfolio less the return of the large cap portfolio. 
The small cap portfolio is calculated by the bottom 20% of stock as ranked by their total 
market capitalization. The large cap portfolio is the remaining stocks within the 
benchmark universe. 
HMB: The return of the value stock portfolio less the return of the growth stock 
portfolio. The value stock portfolio is created by taking the top 30% of stocks within the 
benchmark universe ranked by their corresponding book to market ratio.  The growth 
stock portfolio is the remaining stocks within the universe. The book to market ratio is 
calculated by the book value (total assets less total liabilities and total preferred shares) 
divided by market capitalization (total common shares outstanding multiplied by the 
price per share). 
MOM: The return of the winner portfolio less the return of the loser portfolio. The 
winner portfolio is calculated as the top 30% of stocks within the benchmark universe as 
ranked by the past 12-month momentum. The loser portfolio is the remaining stocks 
within the benchmark universe. The 12-month momentum is calculated as the percentage 
change of the month end price 12 months back to the most current month end price.  
 
The portfolios were rebalanced monthly to reflect the same turnover of the sub-portfolios. 
The multi linear regression of the four-factor model against the sub-index portfolio was 
completed within the statistical add-on package in excel.  This tool is easy and free to use and 
automatically calculates all the needed statistical outputs. Additionally the regression was 
completed in STATA, offering the same results. 
 
4.6.2 Greenhouse	  Gas	  Emission	  Model	  	  
 
The creation of a GHG emission model was looked at to solve the coverage issues of 
Bloomberg and CDP. No academic research has prescribed a well thought-out methodology on 
how to approach this problem and industry providers tend to hold their model creation 
methodology proprietary. Therefore, after reviewing the broad approaches used within the 
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industry (input/output, regression models, financial statement, sector averaging, and EEIO) it was 
decided that unless a rigorous multi-tiered approach was taken, the model would not accurately 
approximate the emissions output of the non-disclosing companies. The companies that have 
disclosed their emissions are used to understand the impact of investing in the best performers in 
an industry in terms of carbon footprinting, known as carbon tilting. The objective is to 
understand in general terms the link between climate change and financial performance for 
portfolio management; how an investor can mitigate their financial risks associated with climate 
mitigation policies and technological or economic trends (for example, carbon pricing or stranded 
assets). The Greenhouse Gas Protocol (2014) also advises that when using carbon tilting in the 
portfolio construction process it can be complemented with green/brown exposure metrics in 
some sectors such as utilities and transportation.  As discussed within the literature review 
section, this will require additional data that is not readily available through data providers and 
therefore, creates a laborious task and is outside the scope of this analysis.  
 
4.7 Step 6: Carbon Emissions - Portfolio Creation 
4.7.1 Benchmark	  Portfolio	  
 
By carbonizing companies and portfolios as mentioned above, the objective is to understand 
the risk, but also that it may be a moral objective to contribute to the transition to a lower carbon 
society. This would provide evidence to investors that it is possible to invest into a lower carbon 
portfolio without suffering a loss in returns. As discussed within the literature review, there are 
two main approaches used for “carbonizing” a portfolio: total emissions/million (ownership) or 
total emissions/sales (efficiency). Both of these approaches will be explored. Prior to discussing 
how the portfolios were created (formulas used), it is important to discuss the universe in which 
these portfolios will be chosen from. 
 
Given that an estimation model was not created, it is important to understand the sector 
allocation of the baseline portfolio; the initial universe that will be used for stock selection. Table 
4-7 demonstrates the sector allocation of the universe for those companies that disclosed versus 
the S&P/TSX Composite index. As demonstrated, the universe will be largely overweight in the 
financial and industrial sector. Therefore, this is not a true representation of the S&P/TSX 
Composite index but rather a representation of firms that are willing to communicate openly to 
their shareholders on their GHG inventory for their investment process. 
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Table 4-7: Sector Allocation Comparison: Carbon Emission Universe vs. S&P/TSX Composite 
Sectors 
Carbon Emissions 
Universe S&P/TSX Composite 
Over/Under 
Weight 
Consumer Discretionary 6.3% 6.9% -0.61% 
Consumer Staples 2.1% 4.5% -2.44% 
Energy 17.6% 18.5% -0.87% 
Financials 44.4% 38.3% 6.12% 
Industrials 10.4% 3.2% 7.17% 
Information Technology 0.6% 8.3% -7.69% 
Materials 10.8% 9.5% 1.28% 
Telecom. Services 
7.1% 5.4% 1.69% 
Utilities 0.7% 2.3% -1.56% 
Health Care 
0%  2.3% -2.30% 
*Sector allocation is by MCAP.  
** Data is used for Carbon universe: March 31st, 2015. Composite: January 29th, 2016. 
(S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016). 
4.7.2 High/Low	  Emissions	  Portfolios	  
 
There are two approaches that were taken for portfolio selection, ownership and efficiency 
method, to differentiate the firms between the best and worse in-class with the metric that is of 
interest. 
 
Ownership method (balance sheet):  The initial universe was broken up into two portfolios, 
entitled high carbon emissions and low carbon emissions. The high carbon emissions portfolio is 
comprised of the stocks that were the top half of stocks by carbon ownership within an industry 
classification. The low carbon emission portfolio is comprised of the stocks that were the bottom 
half of stocks by carbon ownership within an industry classification. If there were an odd number 
of firms within an industry, firms having a higher carbon ownership then average in the industry 
were included the high carbon emissions portfolio and vice versa. If there was only one firm 
within an industry, the average of the industry group was used. Carbon ownership is calculated 
as: total carbon emissions/total float market capitalization.  The portfolios are market cap 
weighted. 
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Efficiency method (income statement): The initial universe was broken up into two portfolios, 
entitled high carbon intensity and low carbon intensity. The high carbon intensity portfolio is 
comprised of the stocks that were the top half of stocks by carbon intensity within an industry 
classification. The low carbon intensity portfolio is comprised of the bottom half of stocks by 
carbon intensity within an industry classification. If there were an odd number of firms within an 
industry, firms having a higher intensity then average in the industry were included in the high 
carbon intensity portfolio and vice versa. If there was only one firm within an industry, the 
average of the industry group was used. Carbon intensity was calculated as: total carbon 
emissions of firm/total sales of firm. The sales and carbon emissions were calculated for the same 
fiscal year, this was ensured by a thorough process of identifying fiscal year end dates (as noted 
previously). The portfolios are market cap weighted. 
 
Two metrics to ‘carbonize’ the baseline portfolio (universe), and best and worst in-class 
portfolios to demonstrate how investing in the best in-class can reduce the carbon footprint of a 
portfolio by one of the methods above. Similar to the approaches for portfolio construction these 
metrics explain the total carbon emissions per million dollars invested (Equation 4-5) and the 
total carbon efficiency (Equation 4-6) of the portfolios, but are normalized statistics, allowing for 
comparison, regardless of portfolio size (normalized by million dollars invested).  
 
Equation 4-5: Portfolio Carbon Emissions (per million dollars invested):  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  %  𝑋  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛  𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑  (𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙. )!!!!  
Where: n = the number of stocks within a portfolio 
 
And Ownership % = 
!"#$%"&'"  !"#$%$"&  (!"#$%&  !"  $  !"#$%&$'  !"  !"#$)!"!#$  !"#$  !"  !"#$  
 
Equation 4-6: Portfolio Carbon Intensity:  𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛  𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!!!!𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑋  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  %!!!!  
(Frankel et al., 2015) 
Where company sales are the total sales from the same fiscal year as the carbon emissions. 
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 Lastly, given that these portfolios were fully re-evaluated each year, the turnover rate of 
these portfolios and the number of constituents within the portfolios at each turnover date (March 
of every year) could vary significantly. Therefore, the cumulative returns at these dates had to be 
normalized. Calculating the return of the portfolio from the start of the month to the end of the 
month solved this problem. For example, a best in class portfolio had a turnover of many 
constituents on March 31st, 2011, some companies fell into the worst class portfolio and new 
companies disclosed their carbon footprints, becoming best in-class.  Therefore, the total float 
market capitalization varied significantly from the previous month and if using the cumulative 
return calculation, it would create a largely inaccurate return. The old portfolio float market 
capitalization was calculated for March 31st, 2011 as well and used in the return calculation for 
the portfolio return on March 31, 2011, and the float market capitalization of the new portfolio 
was used to calculate the return of the portfolio for April 30th 2011, reflecting an accurate return 
of the changes made in the portfolio.  
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5 Results 
5.1 Tiered Divestment Strategies 
The tiered divestment return statistics are listed in Table 5-1 below; Figure 5-1 displays the 
cumulative performance of the divestment portfolios. As demonstrated, the return performance 
continued to increase when taking a more aggressive divestment approach, excluding divestment 
from the utilities sector. Given that the classifications for the utilities sector are poorly 
categorized (i.e., renewable power generators are within this category), a higher level of return 
would not necessarily be what a climate friendly investor would want. As well, the annualized 
risk continued to be relatively constant through each stage of the divestment. Therefore, an 
investor would only be further compensated for the investment at each stage of divestment, as 
shown by the Sharpe ratios. For example, the Sharpe ratio for the coal + energy equipment and 
services divestment was .27, whereas the Shape ratio for the energy sector divestment was .47. 
The information ratio, a measure of the excess return to the excess risk, informs an investor 
whether their excess return to the benchmark is also constant. This means that the high and low 
period of returns are correlated to the benchmark rather than being random. The information ratio 
is fairly moderate, showing that the volatility slowly increases as the tiered portfolio divest stocks 
and become less correlated to the benchmark, which is completely expected.  
 
The energy sector divestment portfolio performed the best overall, producing an annualized 
active return of 1.92% with an annualized volatility of 9.05%, which is less volatile that the 
benchmark. The energy sector comprised 24.80% of the benchmark on average over the five 
years, which is higher than average, compared the other seven sectors. As demonstrated by the 
average # of constituents per month, there were 51 out of 62 energy sector firms considered under 
the industry categorization of oil, gas and consumable fuels. 19 companies were considered either 
a coal company (which was two on average) or on the Carbon Underground 200 list (17 
companies on average). When divesting from these firms, the resulting portfolio had an overall 
return performance close to the full energy sector divestment (19.01% compared to 21.40%). This 
means that a majority of the excess return came from divesting from the companies that are 
considered to have the largest fossil fuel reserves in Canada.  
 
 Overall, the use of a divestment strategy over the period of January 2011 to August 2015 
financially outperformed on a risk/return basis and mitigated the perceived risks of stranded 
assets of the energy and utility sectors. Therefore, the null hypothesis (or hypothesis one) was 
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rejected, and the alternative hypothesis: “Divesting from Canada’s S&P/TSX Composite index as 
an investment strategy financially outperforms relative to the S&P/TSX Composite benchmark” 
was accepted.  
 
Table 5-1: Return Statistics for Divestment Portfolios 
 
Index 
Statistics 
 
*S&P/TSX 
Composite 
Benchmark 
Coal 
Divest. 
Coal + 
Energy 
Equip. & 
Services 
Divest. 
Coal + 
Divest. 
From 
Carbon 
Undergroun
d 200 
Coal + 
Oil, Gas 
Consumab
le Fuels 
Energy 
Sector 
Divest. 
Energy 
+ 
Utilities 
Divest. 
Total Return 11.30% 12.35% 12.89% 19.01% 20.56% 21.40% 21.28% 
Annualized 
Return1 2.36% 2.57% 2.68% 3.87% 4.16% 4.32% 4.30% 
Annualized 
Risk2 9.91% 10.10% 9.89% 9.69% 9.12% 9.05% 9.19% 
Sharpe Ratio3 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.46 
Active Return4 N/A 0.20% 0.31% 1.48% 1.76% 1.92% 1.90% 
Annualized 
Active Risk5 N/A  0.44% .37% 1.66% 3.04% 3.26% 3.21% 
Information 
Ratio N/A 0.45 0.85 0.89 0.58 0.59 0.59 
Average # of 
Constituents/ 
Month 244 242 231 225 193 182 175 
Weight of 
Energy 
Sector6 24.80% 24.43% 23.70% 16.50% 1.24% 0 0 
Weight Dist. 
Increase/ 
Stock7 
 
1.013 1.021 1.203 1.351 1.351 1.386 
*January 2011- August 2015  
1The annualized return is based on the geometric average. Dividends, management fees, and transaction 
costs were not included.  
2Annualized risk is calculating on the on price returns using monthly values and is the annualized standard 
deviation of monthly returns. 
3 Sharpe ratio does not include risk free rate 
4Active Return= Ann. Benchmark Return – Ann. Portfolio Return 
5Annualized active risk is the annualized standard deviation of the active monthly returns.  
6The weight of the energy sector is the arithmetic average of the float MCAP 
7The weight distribution increase for 01/31/2011 each stock varies throughout the time period due to  
relative weight of the divestment portfolio against the index 
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Figure 5-1:  Cumulative Returns of Divestment Portfolios  
 
 
5.2 Re-investment within the S&P/TSX Renewable Energy and Clean 
Technology Index 
 
Table 5-2 displays the return statistics for the divestment strategies with a re-investment 
within the S&P/TSX renewable energy and clean technology index (green index) and Figure 5-2 
displays the cumulative return performance graph.  As clearly shown within the cumulative 
returns graph, the green index unperformed greatly over the past five years (figure 5-2). 
Therefore, any significant investment within this index would have lowered returns of the 
existing portfolio. Divesting away only from the Canadian firms within the Carbon Underground 
200 and re-investing that money within the green index was a more beneficial strategy than that 
of divesting completely away from the energy sector and re-investing into the green index. This is 
a great example of a situation where an investor, albeit if able to predict the future, would have 
chosen the strategy that would have suited his moral background. For example, if an investor is 
willing to trade off some financial return to reallocate their capital to companies whose core 
business practices are aligned to a lower carbon future than they would fully divest and re-invest 
into this index. Otherwise, the former approach would be taken. Both strategies did outperform 
the S&P/TSX Composite index and offered slightly less volatility then the benchmark making 
them better investments than the index from a risk/return perspective. A correlation between both 
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the returns of the divested portfolios and the green index was taken to ensure that price 
movements were not highly correlated, hedging the downside risk. As shown, the return 
correlations between the sub-index and the green index are moderate, therefore adding this index 
will diversify the portfolio in terms of sector allocations and returns. These strategies worked well 
and could be adapted by any investor going forward who is seeking to mitigate their risks within 
the energy sector and wanting to re-invest that capital in more climate change minded companies.  
 
Table 5-2: Return Statistics for Divestment + Re-investment Strategies 
Statistics 
 
S&P/TSX 
Composite 
Coal + 
Energy 
Equipment 
& Services 
Divestment 
Divestment 
From Carbon 
Underground 
200 
Energy 
Sector 
Divestment 
Total Return 11.30% 8.37% 14.67% 14.60% 
Annualized Return 2.32% 1.77% 3.03% 3.02% 
Annualized Risk 9.91% 9.18% 9.15% 8.40% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.23 0.19 0.33 0.36 
Active Return N/A 0.55% 0.71% 0.70% 
Tracking Error N/A 2.23% 1.97% 3.45% 
Information Ratio  
 
0.25 0.36 0.203 
Correlation (Sub Index vs. Green 
Index) 
 
0.742 0.540 0.500 
* January 2011- August 2015   
** All statistics are calculated in the same manner as the tiered divestment statistics 
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Figure 5-2: Cumulative Returns of Divestment + Re-investment Strategies 
 
  
5.3 Return Attribution using Carhart Four Factor Model 
 
The following are the results from the multi-linear regression Carhart models. For simplicity, 
each portfolio will be labeled as follows: 
Portfolio A: Coal + energy equipment & services divestment 
Portfolio B: Coal + divestment from the Carbon Underground 200 
Portfolio C: Energy sector divestment 
Portfolio D: Coal + energy equip. & services divestment w/ re-investment into green index 
Portfolio E: Coal + divestment from the Carbon Underground 200 w/ re-investment into     
                           green index 
Portfolio F: Energy Sector divestment w/ re-investment into green index 
  
Table 5-3 provides the single linear regression results for the CAPM model and Table 5-4 
provides the results for the multi-linear regression for the Carhart model. As displayed in the 
CAPM model the beta for the risk premium, the correlation of the risk premium return to the 
portfolio returns, is highly correlated and explained the majority of the returns, with significance 
values (p values) of less than .0001. This means it is highly likely that the regression model 
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predicts the correct returns. Additionally, the R2 can also be used to demonstrate how correlated 
the data fits the model, also know as the regression line or line of best fit. The R2 are highly 
correlated for all portfolios, stating the regression models can be used as an accurate prediction 
model.  
 
Table 5-3: Single Linear Regression (CAPM Model) 
 r2 (1) Adjusted r2 Root MSE2 Risk Premium3 Alpha4 P-value5 
Portfolio A  0.99871 0.99861 0.00106 0.98894 .00018 <.0001 
Portfolio B 0.9722 .9717 0.00467 0.9562174 .0019 <.0001 
Portfolio C 0.89359 0.89158 0.00855 .85657 .0016 <.0001 
Portfolio D 0.959 0.9582 0.00534 0.896796 -.009 <.0001 
Portfolio E 0.9650 0.9643 0.000495 0.899308 -.0001 <.0001 
Portfolio F .8892 .8871 .00811 .7947346 -.0008 <.0001 
*Number of data points is 55 
1 R2  is a measure of how close the data is to the fitted regression. In this case, of a simple 
linear regression, it mimics a correlation co-efficient. 
2 Root MSE=Root mean squared error. It measures the average of squares of the deviations 
between the linear of best fit and what is estimated. 
3 The risk premium is the beta for the independent variable, it the coefficient to the return of 
the market in excess of the risk free rate. 
4 The alpha is the abnormal rate of return of the portfolios in excess of what would be 
predicted 
5 The p-value determines the significance of the results. A p-value less than .05 typically 
means that the model is significant and can accurately be used for prediction. 
 
 Table 5-4 provides the results of the Carhart four-factor model. The results demonstrate that 
when adding the three additional factors (SML, HML, and MOM) the risk premium is still highly 
correlated to all of the portfolios at high significance levels, demonstrating that the three 
additional factors do not further explain the returns of the portfolios analyzed. These results 
demonstrate that one factor, risk premium, was sufficient enough to explain the cross-section of 
expected returns, within this time period and sample set. Additionally, evidence that the returns of 
the portfolios are mainly driven by systemic (market) risk and the idiosyncratic (stock specific) 
risk is almost non-existent, meaning the portfolios are well diversified. Given that the return 
performance is higher than the benchmark relative to the risk (the Sharpe ratio), investors are 
being compensated for this systemic risk.  
 
Fama and French’s results demonstrated that by adding the three additional factors a more 
reliable model for portfolio return would result, but as demonstrated these results show no 
increase in reliability of returns given that risk premium beta is highly correlated. This is not 
surprising given that these portfolios are quite large and are largely comprised of the S&P/TSX 
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Composite universe. What is interesting is that, albeit very small, the alphas were all positive for 
the divested portfolios (A,B,C) and negative for the re-invested portfolio (D,E,F) in both models. 
This means that the abnormal return in excess of what is predicted is positive for the divested 
portfolios and negative for the portfolios with a re-investment into the green index. Further 
research needs to be done to see if there is significance with negative alphas and green stocks, 
portfolios, and indices. 
 
Table 5-4: Multifactor Regression Results (Carhart Model)  
 
  R2 Adjusted R2 
Root 
MSE 
Risk 
Prem. SML HML 
 
MOM 
Alpha P-
value 
Portfolio 
A  .99871 .99861 .00106 
.98894 - .0013 .0010 .00085 .0002 <.0001 
Portfolio 
B .97494 .97294 .00457 
.96286 - .0010 - .012 - .0021 .00184 <.0001 
Portfolio 
C .91348 .90656 .00794 
.89408 - .0072 - .0287 .00761 .00149 <.0001 
Portfolio 
D .96119 .95808 .00534 
.89294 - .0027 - .0073 - .0046 - .00976 <.0001 
Portfolio 
E .96681 .96416 .00496 
.89867 - .0022 - .0064 - .0045 - .00019 <.0001 
Portfolio 
F .89602 .8877 .00809 
.81336 - .0072 - .0171 .0018 - .00091 <.0001 
*Number of data points is 55 
** Root MSE= root mean standard error (see table 5-3 footnotes for the explanations of statistics) 
 
5.4 Carbon Footprinting Investing 
 
As aforementioned, establishing a baseline is essential for the approaches that are taken when 
using a carbon footprinting approach for portfolio selection. As discovered through the literature 
review and articulated in the methodology section, a balance sheet and income statement 
approach was used. The market capitalization, referring to both the allocation of ownership and 
sales, referring to the efficiency of carbon use, will be used to demonstrate the characteristics of 
the universe prior to dividing the universe in two portfolios (the best and worst in class). As 
shown in Table 5-5 below these figures are normalized to be comparable to other portfolios.  
 
Table 5-5: Carbon Intensity and Total Carbon Metrics 
  
Total Carbon 
Intensity 
Total Carbon Emissions of 
Portfolio (ownership)  
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(efficiency)  
(t CO2 e/ $M) 
(t CO2e/ $M) 
2011  440.62  210.421 
2012  270.82  189.21 
2013  265.83  220.57 
2014  362.40  244.33 
2015  197.87  173.54 
Average 307.50 207.61 
* Carbon Metrics are for March of every year.  
** The Carbon intensity is calculated by equation 4-6 and total carbon emissions of portfolio is 
calculated by equation 4-5 
 
The average carbon intensity of the universe portfolio over the five-years was 307.51 and the 
average carbon emissions of the portfolio (ownership) were 207.62.  Although the intensity did 
decrease throughout the years and the carbon emissions by ownership did vary, this can be due to 
a multitude of factors such as different constituents entering into the universe, increased 
efficiency, or more share releases, therefore, no conclusions can be made.  
 
It is also important to understand the sector dynamics of the benchmark universe, used for 
both methods in portfolio selection. This will also aid in providing some insight into if the 
divestment portfolios would also have a lower carbon portfolio per million dollars invested or a 
lower carbon intense portfolio from divesting away from the energy sector or the utilities sector. 
As demonstrated in Table 5-6 the utility sector is the most carbon emissions per million invested 
and the most carbon intense industry. The energy, equipment and services industry group is 
second most intensive. Therefore, divesting from the oil, gas, & consumable fuels industry group 
and the utilities sector would mitigate an investor’s exposure to carbon risks in this sample. 
 
Table 5-6: Average Carbon Intensity (per million) and Emissions/Million Invested 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Sector/ 
Industry Avg. Int. 
Avg. 
Em./ 
$M 
Avg. 
Int. 
Avg.  
Em./$
M 
Avg. 
Int. 
Avg. 
Em./$
M 
Avg. 
Int. 
Avg. 
Em./
$M 
Avg. 
Int. 
Avg. 
Em./$
M 
Energy 
Equipment 
& Services 124 30 1507 1283 118 118 128 23 139 29 
Oil, Gas & 
Cons. 
Fuels 1582 3988 1636 1091 1683 815 1567 960 1770 747 
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Materials 430 476 757 479 391 705 334 350 410 276 
Industrials 232 191 184 141 255 227 205 291 142 130 
Consumer 
Discret. 128 67 66 36 140 117 126 50 66 48 
Consumer 
Staples 27 60 37 79 39 247 43 110 81 418 
Financials 4 14 39 16 25 12 30 16 62 18 
Info. Tech. 11 15 22 39 17 16 13 13 N/A N/A 
Telecom. 
Services 22 10 13 44 88 11 96 13 18 15 
Utilities 8354 1751 6656 4804 4743 3976 6416 4528 7885 7586 
* Both average intensity and average emission/million dollars invested were calculated using the 
portfolio construction equations ie. Total carbon emissions/total sales (per million) and total 
carbon emissions/ total FMCAP (per million) 
 
It is also useful to look at the range of the individual constituents within the utilities sector to 
ensure that there are not any outliers skewing the average. As an example, Figure 5-3 displays the 
companies within the utility sector and their associated carbon intensity. TransAlta (TA.) is an 
outlier within the utilities sector, and is among the most carbon intense companies in the entire 
benchmark universe (TransAlta is alongside Enbridge, Trican, and Canadian Oil Sands as the 
most intensive). This is not surprising given that this utility provider operates coal-fired power 
plants that comprise 41% of their net generating capacity (TransAlta, 2016). If more renewable 
electricity producers disclosed their carbon footprints, surely the sector average would go down 
and TransAlta would be driven out further as an outlier. This is not the case, however, for this 
data set. Any investments made within the utility sector, aside from Algonquin Power and 
Utilities (AQN.), is above the average of the entire benchmark universe and would increase the 
carbon footprint of the portfolio, increasing exposure to the perceived risks of regulatory and 
carbon pricing mechanisms. Additionally, two interesting conclusions can be made out of this 
example. Firstly, this is an explicit example of how the GICS need to be revised to embrace more 
core business practices within their broad categorization. The industry is seeking out new ways of 
categorizing companies and GICS will fall short if they do not update their classifications or 
create new ones. Second, TransAlta, although being the most intense, is listed on the Jantzi Social 
Index. The Jantzi social index screens companies to find 50 companies that pass a set of broadly 
based ESG criteria (Sustainalytics, 2016). TransAlta has a mix of hydro, wind and solar 
generation (31% of net capacity). This demonstrates that green/brown metrics could aid in 
differentiating this company as a best or worst in class against its industry peers. 
 
Figure 5-3: Carbon Intensity of Companies in Utility Sector 
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5.4.1 Portfolio	  Returns	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  for	  Low	  Carbon	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  Carbon	  Emissions	  
Portfolios	  (Investing	  Best	  &	  Worst	  In-­‐Class,	  Ownership	  Method)	  
 
Using the ownership methodology for investing, the results for the two portfolios are 
displayed below. First, however, it was useful to understand how the market capitalization of the 
sectors varied between the two portfolios. More specifically, it was useful to understand if 
dividing the companies amongst their sub-industry peers created a difference in sector weighting 
of the resulting portfolios. It is obvious that this is unrealistic due to the nature of the each 
company’s market capitalization being different and the way in which the portfolio construction 
process took place. For example, some companies, such as Gildan Activewear, were the only 
ones within their sub-industry classification and thus always fell into the high carbon portfolio 
due to carbon efficient business types of the consumer discretionary industry group peers. For 
industry groups that did have many companies disclose their carbon footprint, such as financials, 
materials and energy, it was very important to use the sub-industry classification to distinguish 
between their business types. Figure 5-4 below demonstrates that both the high and low carbon 
portfolios had a relatively highly weighted financial sector, due to 20 financial companies 
disclosing their carbon footprint and having large FMCAPs. By dividing the companies up 
among their industry group peers, the portfolio weightings for the resulting two portfolios are 
different. If an overall sector did have poor performance throughout this five-year period, this 
would affect the portfolio differently.   
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Figure 5-4: Sector weighting for the High and Low Carbon Portfolios (by Float MCAP) 
 
 
 
 
*based on a five year average 
 
The statistical results for the two portfolios are displayed in Table 5-7 below, with the 
cumulative return performance displayed in Figure 5-5. Given that the benchmark portfolio return 
for the ownership approach is negative, -1.38%, whereas the benchmark portfolio return for the 
divestment portfolios was largely positive, 11.30 %, it is difficult to demonstrate overall positive 
performance of any sub-universe portfolio for the carbon footprint approaches. As shown in 
Table 4-7 the industrial and financial sectors were overweight in this benchmark universe, 
therefore, underweighting slightly most other sectors. The reason for this poor return could lie 
within the companies that chose to disclose their footprint, the weighting methodology or not 
incorporating the total return (ie. dividends). No conclusions can be made and further analysis is 
needed because the poor benchmark return does not support asset managers well in Canada when 
wanting to choose solely a carbon footprint approach for investing. 
 
The low carbon portfolio did outperform the benchmark, and therefore also the high carbon 
portfolio. Although the low carbon portfolio did not minimize risk compared to the benchmark, it 
is better from a risk/return perspective, as shown when comparing the Sharpe ratios. The Sharpe 
ratio in general (annualized return/ annualized risk) is poor compared to industry standards, 
understanding that it is the amount of return given for every unit of risk. No investment manager 
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would think that this is a reasonable strategy since government issued investments would 
generally have a higher return and no perceived risk. In Table 5-8 the carbon footprint statistics 
are illustrated. Given that the portfolios were created based upon the ownership method, it is 
important to look at whether the total carbon emissions decreased for the low carbon portfolio. As 
demonstrated, the total carbon emissions decreased by 85.79 tCo2/ $Million on average over the 
period. This means that the low carbon emissions portfolio decreased their exposure to carbon 
emissions by 41% on average. The ownership method strategy from a carbon footprint reductions 
perspective performed well. Given that the low carbon portfolio did still outperform the 
benchmark, this strategy should definitely not be dismissed, rather the issues of this approach 
should be identified and investigated.  
 
Two issues of this approach, sector allocations and the chosen market capitalization 
weighting, are important to discuss. For example, the low carbon portfolio has over a 40% 
weighting in the financial sector. Financial institutions are exposed to carbon through the 
investments they make and are not calculated within their carbon footprint. If regulations or 
carbon pricing do come into place and negatively affect the energy sector, surely some of the 
loans that the banks have provided this sector will feel these affects.  Using a weighting cap for 
the portfolios construction process or different weighting approach overall, could have changed 
the results. If a different weighting approach, such as an equally weighted universe, the sector 
allocation and perhaps the benchmark return would have been quite different. A non-market 
capitalization weighted approach might be good to investigate as well. Additionally, dividends 
should be incorporated to provide reward for the investors who invest in more value firms (firms 
that have a stable share price but offer a higher and consistent dividend) that do not receive great 
price returns. Further ideas for research will be discussed within the conclusions.  
 
Table 5-7: Return Statistics: High Carbon/ $Million invested vs. Low Carbon/$Million invested 
Statistics 
Initial Index 
Portfolio 
High 
Carbon 
Portfolio 
Low 
Carbon 
Portfolio 
Total Return -1.38% -2.01% 1.45% 
Annualized Return -0.31% -0.46% 0.33% 
Annualized Risk 9.76% 10.92% 9.80% 
Sharpe Ratio -0.03 -0.04 0.03 
Active Return N/A -0.15% 0.64% 
Tracking Error N/A 3.30% 3.67% 
Information Ratio  N/A -0.04 0.17 
# of Constituents on Average 86  42  44  
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*March 2011-August 2015. 
** All statistics are created using the formulas for the statistics within section 5.1 
 
Overall both the ownership and efficiency methods for carbon footprinting created best in-
class portfolios that performed better relative to the universe benchmark. These portfolios also 
lowered the carbon footprint of the universe portfolio significantly. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis: “Using a carbon emission metric as an investment 
strategy financially outperforms the universe benchmark” was accepted.  
 
Figure 5-5: Cumulative Returns for Emissions/$Million Strategies 
 
 
Table 5-8: Carbon Footprint Statistics 
	  	   High Carbon Low Carbon 
  
Total Carbon 
Intensity  
(t CO2 e/ $M) 
Total Carbon 
Emissions of Portfolio 
(t CO2e/ $M) 
Total Carbon 
Intensity  
(t CO2 e/ $M) 
Total Carbon 
Emissions of Portfolio 
(t CO2e/ $M) 
2011  477.69  210.42 374.18 164.27 
2012  321.46  189.21 205.66 126.871 
2013  456.98  220.57 158.84 105.64 
2014  454.14  244.33 194.73 115.34 
2015  228.13  173.54 159.03 96.98 
Aver. 387.68 207.61 218.48 121.82 
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5.4.2 Portfolio	  Return	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Portfolios	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Using the efficiency method, the results for the best and worst in-class portfolios are 
displayed below. Again, it was useful to understand how the market capitalization of the industry 
groups varied between the two portfolios. As demonstrated in Figure 5-6 below the weightings of 
the two portfolios do vary slightly, but not as great as in the ownership method. Therefore, if a 
sector had an overall positive or negative performance due to an external variable, such as a 
changing currency, then it would impact the portfolios more evenly than that of the ownership 
approach. Within investment management, external factors are always prone to affect the 
performance of portfolios and this analysis draws attention to how the external variable, carbon, 
affects portfolio performance. 
 
Figure 5-6: Sector Weightings for High and Low Carbon Intensity Portfolios (by Float MCAP)  
  
 
* Based on the five-year average.  
 
The statistics for the return performance of the high and low carbon intense portfolios are 
listed in Table 5-9 below and the cumulative return graph is Figure 5-7. The benchmark statistics 
for this method are different than that of the previous method due to missing sales data, but still 
offers a negative total return of -3.7% The low carbon portfolio did outperform the benchmark 
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(hence the high carbon portfolio) with an annualized active return of 1.10%. As with the previous 
method, this is a very slim margin with no transaction costs and management fees taken into 
account. Additionally, the annualized risk and tracking error are quite high. The poor sharpe ratio 
(.02), a measure of return for every unit of volatility, demonstrates low correlated stocks are 
needed to decrease the volatility and perhaps to increase the return. Even when analyzing the 
volatility relative to the benchmark, the low carbon intensity portfolio is still volatile, showing 
that the excess returns of the portfolio fluctuate and that the portfolio is perhaps not rewarded 
enough financially for this increased risk. Although the efficiency method for investment did 
provide increased returns, the greater risk might not be worth it to any investor. Table 5-10 below 
displays the carbon footprints for the portfolios. Given that this is the carbon efficiency approach, 
it is important to look at whether the carbon efficiency of the portfolio increased. As 
demonstrated, the carbon efficiency did increase by 211.1 tCO2/$Millions on average over the 
period. This means that the low carbons emissions portfolio decreased the exposure to carbon 
emissions by 68% on average. The efficiency method strategy from a carbon reductions 
perspective worked well. Similar to the method above, this method should not be dismissed and 
further research is needed to demonstrate what other components can be blended into this 
approach to offer an investor a risk/return profile that they are comfortable with.  
 
Table 5-9: Return Statistics for High Carbon Intensity vs. Low Carbon Intensity  
Statistics 
Initial Index 
benchmark 
(portfolio) 
High 
Carbon 
Portfolio 
Low 
Carbon 
Portfolio 
Total Return -3.7% -9% 1.40% 
Annualized Return -0.80% -2% 0.30% 
Annualized Risk 12.68% 12% 17.70% 
Sharpe Ratio -0.07 -0.18 0.02 
Annualized Active Return N/A -1.20% 1.10% 
Tracking Error N/A 5.64% 8.50% 
Information Ratio  N/A -.21 0.13 
# of Constituents on 
Average 86 39 47 
* March 2011- August 2015. 
** All the statistics are calculation using the equation in section 5.1 
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Figure 5-7: Cumulative Return for Carbon Intensity Strategies 
 
 
Table 5-10: Carbon Footprints Statistics 
  High Intensity Low Intensity 
  
Total Carbon 
Intensity 
(t CO2 e/ $M) 
Total Carbon 
Emissions of Portfolio 
(t CO2e/ $M) 
Total Carbon 
Intensity  
(t CO2 e/ $M) 
Total Carbon 
Emissions of Portfolio 
(t CO2e/ $M) 
2011  737.29  73.72 179.41 113.53 
2012  450.00  44.99 130.61 101.14 
2013  435.10  43.51 123.82 97.65 
2014  593.27  59.32 134.18 86.34 
2015  331.85  33.18 107.94 83.37 
Aver. 509.50 50.94 135.19 96.40 
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6 Conclusions 
 
Whether Canada chooses to adhere to its responsibilities to meet its climate change targets or 
not, investors in Canada have a lot to be concerned about. The imminent threat of human induced 
climate change will have the global community reacting in ways that will affect Canada and their 
investors. Therefore, these investors need to be aware of financial mitigation and adaptation 
techniques. Although, there are a multitude of public and private financial techniques, this thesis 
specifically looked at techniques within the Canadian equity markets. Given that greenhouse 
gases (equivalent carbon emissions, referred to as carbon emissions with this thesis) are directly 
linked to climate change, the ways in which an investor can mitigate their exposure to carbon 
related risks and re-allocate their capital to support a lower carbon society was analyzed. This 
paper tested the financial performance of two strategies that mitigate against carbon related 
exposure in respect to climate change, fossil fuel divestment and carbon footprinting. Before 
discussing the results of these two strategies, and the ideas for future research, a brief summary of 
how the literature review aided in the analysis will be discussed. 
 
The statistics and models that came out of the modern portfolio theorists’ work aided 
investors in having quantitative approaches for understanding and predicting portfolio returns and 
risks. The efficient frontier and the asset pricing models were explained within the literature 
review and methodology and were shown within the results for the two strategies within this 
paper; mainly, the risk/return profile of the investments compared to a benchmark, and the capital 
asset pricing and Carhart models. As aforementioned, modern portfolio theory contrasts 
behavioral theory, which demonstrates that investors cannot implement these quantitative 
approaches successfully due to cognitive biases and human errors. Behavioral theory alludes to 
human emotion as an element of the investment process that should not be dismissed as readily as 
modern portfolio theory seems to do. Investors fall within the spectrum of the beliefs and 
implementations of the modern portfolio and behavioral theorists’ work (known as conventional 
and SRI investors). Due to the growing concerns of a carbon bubble, there is a need to implement 
non-financial criterion to the investment process. Therefore, the techniques that were used in this 
paper for portfolio construction stem from behavioral theory and are within the growing field of 
socially responsible investing. As discussed, the predominant two techniques that address climate 
change which were used are fossil fuel free divestment and carbon footprinting for portfolio 
selection using a best in-class technique.  
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This analysis demonstrates that the paradigms of both modern portfolio theory and behavioral 
theory collide when addressing the concerns of a carbon-constrained society; mainly that 
divestment and carbon footprinting strategies are implemented because of both risk and returns 
concerns and moral and ethical ideologies. Conventional investors are concerned about the issue 
of stranded assets in regards to the energy and utilities sector while SRI investors want to divest 
from a moral and ethical standpoint because it is unjust to support fossil fuel extraction.  The 
carbon footprinting approach appeals to conventional investors who see end use policy and 
regulations of carbon as an imminent risk, such as a limit of emissions for a company or a price 
on carbon. Furthermore, it appeals to SRI investors because they are reallocating their capital to 
support a lower carbon society. Therefore, within the spectrum of conventional to socially 
responsible types, investors are wanting to test out strategies that address the pending climate 
charge targets, checking whether the performance of such strategies maintain their risk/return 
profile and if there are investment opportunities to support a lower carbon society. 
  
The results demonstrated that over the period January 2011-August 2015 from a risk/return 
perspective, it was beneficial to divest from the energy sector within Canada at any degree. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. The 
carbon footprint results were more complicated due to the overall benchmark having an overall 
negative return but both of the best in-class portfolios, (the low carbon emissions portfolio and 
the carbon efficient portfolio) did perform better on risk/return basis and both decreased the 
carbon footprint substantially. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis was accepted.  
 
Markowitz (1959) explains that the utility maxim, point of optimality for investments are the 
portfolios that lie on the efficient frontier where one cannot receive a greater level of return for a 
given level of risk. As shown in the tiered divestment results, the S&P/TSX Composite index is 
not an efficient portfolio, and the divested portfolios received a greater return for a similar or 
lower level of risk. This means that any index investor type, should diversify their holdings across 
all sectors but the energy sector and utilities sector, finding indices and exchange traded funds 
that are fossil free. Additionally, the tiered divestment results demonstrated that when divesting 
away from the firms listed on the Carbon Underground 200 (the firms with the largest about of 
fossil fuel reserves), the return increased most dramatically over the five-year period. As Fischer 
(2015) notes, stranded assets are an evitable part of climate change policy. It cannot be 
determined that this above average performance was derived solely because the market is 
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understanding stranded assets risk, perhaps discounting these assets, but it is a relationship 
nonetheless. The change in oil price could have just as easily affected the earnings of these firms. 
This is an important concern when addressing how applicable this investment model is for future 
use. The decrease in oil price, dropping from around $100 dollars (2011-2014) to under $50 a 
barrel in (2014-2015) (Macrotrends, 2016), marked a rapid change in the commodity price. The 
commodity price of oil directly affects the entire supply chain for oil. The extractors, producers, 
and transporters would be affected as well as the end us consumers. Given the lower oil price 
companies at the beginning of the supply chain, such as all companies marked as an oil company 
within the energy sector, would need to accept decreased revenues until the global supply of oil 
increased. Whereas, end consumer would receive the benefits of this decreased price by saving 
more per barrel purchased. Given that the commodity price directly affects the revenues and the 
savings of the companies within the supply chain, this could lead to share price changes of these 
firms as well.  Therefore, this investment model should be used alongside the tracking of oil 
prices and is best suited for a low oil price.  
 
The CAPM and Carhart model results demonstrate that CAPM is sufficient to explain the 
attribution of returns for the time period. These results go against Fama and French (1993) claims 
that the risk premium only explains 70% of the return. Fama and French’s research was only 
tested within the US and for a longer and different time period. To demonstrate if the Carhart 
model could be applied to the Canadian markets, more portfolios that are further diversified away 
from the market would have to be studied, and for longer period of time. Lastly, to re-instate, 
some believe that the SRI portfolios under-perform conventional portfolios as the investment 
opportunity is constrained by the non-financial criterion and mean-variance efficient portfolios 
are not achievable (Tippet, 2001; Kahn et al. 1997; Geczy et al. 2005; Gregory et al. 1997). These 
results shown contradictory evidence of this and these results further support Bauer, Derwall, & 
Otten (2007) in studing the how SRI funds performance within the Canadian markets. 
 
The carbon footprinting portfolio results supported Statman (2000) claims that a firm can “do 
well by doing good” by demonstrating over performance of portfolios relative to the universe 
benchmark, that were created by selecting the top firms by a carbon footprinting metric against 
their sub-industry peers. These results complement the body of literature that support the link of 
SRI to positive financial performance. Through the discussions within the results, examples such 
as TransAlta being a top emitter but utilizing renewable power capacity, demonstrates the need, 
as 2 Degrees Investing Initiative (2013) suggested, to implement a blended approach of carbon 
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footprinting investment strategies. Thaler’s (2010) claims of investors are not rational but are 
normal and that risk should be more than volatility is shown with socially responsible investing 
and within this overall analysis. Investors are seeking ways to invest with more perspectives that 
incorporate climate change and creating their own subjective utility maxim. Unfortunately, the 
firms that an investor within Canadian equities can invest within while utilizing an SRI approach 
and maintaining their risk/return profile, only goes as far as the large cap S&P/TSX Composite 
index. The green index, which is comprised of many small caps firms not within the S&P/TSX 
Composite index, has yet to be rewarded for their climate friendly core business practices. This 
issue will be discussed further in the following paragraph. 
 
The systemic problems of the overall market are shown with the re-investment potential. It 
was important to understand if an investor can hedge their carbon related risk, however, 
understanding the opportunities for where an investor can reallocate their capital needs to be 
addressed further. As this research has demonstrated, the S&P/TSX Renewable and Clean Tech 
index does not offer competitive returns relative to other Canadian indices. The market 
capitalization of the companies within the non-renewable sector is huge (348,604 million as of 
August 31, 2015) in comparison to the companies that are offering renewable and clean tech 
solutions (5,432 million (maximum)) (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016). If all investors, therefore, 
were wanting to divest from the non-renewable energy sector and re-invest into green companies, 
or invest in best in-class companies within the broad market index and diversify through green 
companies, it would not be feasible and non-public market financing opportunities would have to 
be sought out. The financial and non-renewable energy sector are heavily weighted in the overall 
equity market, and their linkage needs to be analyzed further to understand the implications and 
the fear of divesting from the energy sector and further investing into the financial sector. Indices 
such as the Jantzi social index heavily weigh financial institutions (Blackrock, 2016), which is a 
misleading approach for sustainable investing. Mutual funds within Canada comprise 31% of 
Canadians overall wealth (The Investment Funds Institute of Canada, 2016), and if the public 
markets within Canada do not provide companies that Canadians are wanting to invest within, 
other country markets or private investment would have to be sought out. This would only occur 
if Canadians speak out to their associated asset managers and put their capital where their moral 
and ethical ideologies lie. Therefore, the issue of the Canadian equity markets currently not 
providing enough capital opportunities for Canadians to support a lower carbon society is a 
tangled issue and needs to be further analyzed.  The closing paragraphs, will discuss other 
limitations and ideas for future research. 
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There are seven limitations that will be discussed. First, home bias is inherently a limitation. 
Although it is known that it is useful to diversify a portfolio across countries, it would have not 
been an accurate portrayal of the Canadian markets, supporting the societal need to transition to a 
lower carbon society. Second, the Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) does not 
accurately categorize companies based upon their core business practices. This brought forth 
complications when divesting, specifically away from the utilities sector. Third, only using the 
stock price for calculating the return (price return) offered lower return than the total return would 
have. Total returns incorporate dividends and other distribution realizations. Many indices use 
both return methodologies to demonstrate performance. Given that total return demonstrates 
higher performance throughout the period, this would have enhanced the poor performing carbon 
footprint universe and resulting portfolios. The big banks are renowned dividend payers in 
Canada (Tattersall, 2016) and the heavily weighted financial sector could have provided more 
significant returns. Fourth, the coverage offered by the carbon data providers was not robust and 
the inability to receive an available estimation model made the carbon emissions universe not 
representative of the S&P/TSX Composite index. Fifth, by only using the carbon footprint 
approach, it was difficult to differentiate amongst companies within a certain sector that could 
have green exposure (such as renewable power or research in advancing cleaner technologies) 
that is not encapsulated in the carbon footprint metric.  Additionally, the annualized carbon 
footprint doesn’t incorporate firms who are improving their efficiency and becoming proactive to 
change their core business practices to more climate-friendly practices. Sixth, the inability of 
being able to constrain by sector exposure or tracking error from the benchmark created 
difficulties in being able to provide portfolios are similar to the overall broad market for the 
carbon footprint strategies. Lastly, a major overall issue of both approaches was not being able to 
control the change in oil price.  
 
The following are five ideas (topics) for further research. First, given the issues of being able 
to differentiate industry peers based upon their carbon emissions improvements and their 
involvement with green energy or technology, analyzing investment strategies in the Canadian 
equity markets that encompass blended carbon footprinting strategies is of interest. Additionally, 
non-market capped weighted approaches to carbon footprinting and/or constraints to investments 
(such as sector constraints or benchmark volatility constraints) would be interesting. Second, 
understanding that the green indices within Canada are not performing well and there is a 
minimal amount of capital to invest into, investigating private investment opportunities in Canada 
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for investors who are uninterested in providing all of their capital to the Canadian equity markets 
but would like to keep their money in Canada. Different financing opportunities need to be 
embraced to support the transition to a lower carbon society if these companies cannot be 
competitive on the public markets. Third, analyzing linkages between financial institutions and 
the non-renewable energy sector in Canada. The big five banks in Canada are seen as a risk 
adverse and socially responsible investment. Further analysis might demonstrate some causes for 
concern. Fourth, analyzing the sector allocation of the carbon footprint portfolios to see the 
performance for the sectors. This would provide more insight into which sectors it was more 
beneficial to invest by a carbon footprint methodology and it would provide a sector specific 
approach to the link of carbon and financial performance. Lastly, it would be very useful to 
analyze how much carbon allocation an investor is able to have if they would want to remain 
within the climate change targets. Drawing a link across the spectrum from firms to investor to 
provinces to provinces up to Canada, how much capital is able to finance the continuing carbon 
emissions outputs and how much capital needs to be reallocated. This is broader analysis is much 
broader than that of the equity markets and needs a systems analysis approach.  
 
This thesis, Divesting and Re-investing into a Greener Future for Canada, outlined how an 
investor can utilize two carbon-related strategies that should be of interest for any investor, 
ranging from conventional to SRI. This topic is of great importance due to the Canada’s and the 
world’s climate change targets.  Any investor should not readily dismiss the imminent threats of 
climate change, the world is changing and the way investors perceive the market should change 
as well.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: List of companies within the Carbon Underground 200 
 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Companies Oil Gt CO2 
Gas  
Gt CO2 
Total 
Reserves 
Canadian Natural   Resources  0.788 0.208 0.996 
Imperial Oil  0.527 0.025 0.552 
Cenovus Energy  0.326 0.048 0.374 
Husky Energy  0.215 0.128 0.343 
Crescent Point Energy  0.146 0.011 0.157 
Suncor Energy  0.713 0.003 0.716 
Pacific Rubiales Energy  0.124 0.030 0.154 
Penn West Petroleum  0.100 0.036 0.136 
ARC Resources  0.046 0.066 0.112 
Canadian Oil Sands  0.102 0.000 0.102 
Tourmaline Oil  0.014 0.079 0.093 
Enerplus  0.043 0.037 0.080 
Peyto E&D  0.008 0.079 0.087 
Encana  0.081 0.467 0.548 
Teck Resources 2.603   2.603 
Capital Power 0.367   0.367 
MEG Energy  0.173 0.000 0.173 
Mitsui & Co  0.048 0.095 0.143 
Prophecy Coal 0.272   0.272 
Total     8.008 
 
  
